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OBJECTIVE TESTS AND SUBJECTIVE BIAS: SOME
PROBLEMS OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW
ANDREW D. LEIPOLD*
INTRODUCTION
Much has changed in the area of race and the criminal law over
the last thirty years, but three things remain constant. First, despite
the formal repudiation of racism at all levels of government, racial
bias continues to play a role in the investigation and prosecution of
crimes.' Second, most of the judicial efforts to eliminate racism have
focused on a particularly ugly strain of the problem: intentional dis-
crimination by state actors.2 Disparate racial effects of police or
prosecutorial conduct have traditionally not been enough to induce a
constitutional or statutory remedy. Finally, the increasing number of
crimes and the increasing strain on the judiciary have led courts
slowly, but steadily, to preclude inquiries into the allegedly biased ac-
tor's state of mind.
The first two themes are obviously related, the third, less so.
Most decisions that preclude an inquiry into a state actor's motive
have been formally unrelated to the problem of race; normally, the
goal in moving to an objective standard has been to streamline the
pretrial and trial process. 3 And to a great extent, this effort has suc-
ceeded. Questions about police behavior, prosecutorial decisionmak-
ing, and the behavior of juries are far easier to resolve now than they
* Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. My thanks to Randall Ken-
nedy and Richard McAdams for their helpful comments on drafts of this article. I am also
extremely grateful for the support provided by the Ross and Helen Workman Research Fund.
1. There is a large body of scholarship discussing the significant impact of race on the
criminal justice system. A few examples of the recent work are RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr-RACE, CRIME, AND PUN-
ISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF
COLOR (1993); Tracey Macin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998).
Many of the sources cited infra have also contributed greatly to the debate on this issue.
2. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (noting that an equal protec-
tion violation requires proof of both discriminatory effect and intent); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962) (same). The intent requirement is not limited to challenges in criminal cases.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a thorough study on the impact of the intent
requirement, see Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991).
3. See infra Part III.A.
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would be if a challenge required a probe into what a particular deci-
sionmaker actually thought on a particular day.
But the results, while unintended, have been significant to those
suspects and defendants who reasonably believe that their case is
tinged with racial animus. My thesis is that this process of objectifying
certain claims and defenses is intimately related to the first two
themes, and is in fact in conflict with them. Simply put, by moving the
inquiry of certain issues away from the actor's mindset, courts have
undermined the ability to root out vestiges of race-based behavior.
The cumulative impact of these moves has been to deny defendants
the chance to have their claims of racial bias considered on the merits,
thereby eroding the many other efforts that courts have made to mini-
mize the influence of race on the criminal law.4
After Part II provides a brief background, Part III explores some
of the ways that courts (particularly the Supreme Court) have under-
mined the anti-discrimination efforts by objectifying the pretrial pro-
cess. It argues that there are a surprising number of steps in which the
opportunity to raise claims of bias has been closed off, not because of
judicial hostility to these claims, but because of the need to minimize
the number of issues that are litigated in a criminal case. As in other
areas, the high demand on judicial resources ripples through the sub-
stantive and procedural criminal law in quiet but meaningful ways.
Part IV then asks if there is a better way to reconcile the compet-
ing demands of judicial economy and bias-free decisionmaking. It
suggests that one of the easiest steps to take would be to have the
government gather precise data on the size and scope of the correla-
tion between race and crime. The short-term hope is that this data
collection would productively inform the debate on racial bias in the
system; the long-term goal would be to use the civil power of the
courts to make systemic corrections (if needed), rather than relying on
the inefficient, case-by-case resolution of racial claims that is now em-
ployed.5 To that end, Part IV suggests a way of modifying the proce-
dures for detecting discriminatory intent, shifting some of the burden
onto the state to show the propriety of its behavior. Recognizing the
difficulties presented by these larger proposals, this Part ends with a
few suggestions of smaller steps that could be taken to ensure that
4. For a discussion of some of these efforts, see infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part IV.B.1.
[Vol. 73:559
OBJECTIVE TESTS AND SUBJECTIVE BIAS
police, prosecutors, and juries remain as bias-free as practical, without
eroding the ability of these groups to perform their important work.6
II. CONFLICTING THEMES
The Supreme Court has long recognized that racial bias presents
a pervasive and insidious problem for the enforcement of criminal
laws. And so for at least the last half century, the Court has-at least
in its own eyes-"engaged in 'unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial
prejudice from our criminal justice system."' 7 Even in cases where a
claim of racial bias is rejected, the Court is often careful to point out
that its commitment to removing this stain on the process is
unwavering. 8
But this commitment is qualified in an important respect. While
there is plenty of statistical evidence that a disproportionate number
of African Americans are arrested, charged, and convicted for crimes,
and some evidence that they are disproportionately punished,9 dispa-
rate impact is not enough: despite sharp criticism of the requirement,
the Court continues to demand proof of discriminatory intent before
it will find that Black and other minority defendants have been denied
equal protection of the law. 10
6. See infra Part IV.B.2.
7. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
85 (1986) (noting Court's "unceasing efforts" to eliminate racial bias in jury selection
procedures)).
8. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996) (rejecting Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to allegedly pretextual police stop, but noting that stops based on race of suspect
are improper and subject to challenge under Equal Protection Clause); Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 478, 486 (1991) (rejecting fair cross-section challenge to petit jury, but denying that
decision reflects racial insensitivity); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 (noting consistent efforts to
eliminate impact of race on justice system); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 (1965) (re-
jecting equal protection claim, but declaring that principle of equal opportunity to serve on juries
has been "consistently and repeatedly applied in many cases coming before this Court").
9. According to the March 1995 update from the U.S. Census Bureau, there were roughly
33.5 million Black Americans, making up about 12.8% of the population. See U.S. Bureau of the
Census, The Black Population in the U.S.: March 1995, tbl.1 (visited Apr. 22, 1998) <http://
www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/black95tabs.html>. Nevertheless, in 1995 Afri-
can Americans made up 30.9% of those arrested for crimes, Bureau of Criminal Justice Statis-
tics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-199 6 , at 382 tbl.4.10
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1997) [hereinafter Bureau of Criminal Justice Statis-
tics], and 33.6% of those convicted in federal court. See id. at 441 tbl.5.20. Almost 81% of the
convicted Black defendants were sentenced to incarceration by the federal courts; 75% of the
convicted White defendants were incarcerated. See id. at 443 tbl.5.22. The percentage of each
race sentenced to incarceration varied with the crime charged. For example, Blacks were more
likely than Whites to be incarcerated following a conviction on drug charges, while Whites were
more likely than Blacks to be incarcerated following conviction for property crimes. See id.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at
292. The Court has made it clear that proof of discriminatory intent requires more than simply
deliberate action coupled with an awareness of the racial impact: "It implies that the deci-
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This requirement has profound implications for unearthing race-
based decisionmaking. Proving a person's state of mind is notoriously
difficult, particularly when that person has been accused of improper
behavior and has an incentive to lie. The problem is compounded
when the state of mind in question belongs to a police officer or prose-
cutor, repeat players in the court system who have a sophisticated
sense of how to testify effectively. 1 Put bluntly, if police perjury is as
common as some suspect, 12 the likelihood of discovering an improper
motive through the judicial process is slim indeed.
The difficulty of proving intent suggests in turn that there is a
systematic under-detection of race-based behavior. Faced with the
daunting task of proving state of mind, defendants will often lack the
resources or the will to make the allegation.13 While this means that
many frivolous charges of racism will never be brought, it also means
that some legitimate claims will be foregone as well. Here there is an
interesting parallel to the inquiry at trial: because we prefer to free
the guilty rather than convict the innocent, all twelve jurors must be
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or we refuse to punish
even those who are almost certainly guilty.14 So it is with constitu-
tional claims of racism: to establish the violation, we require evidence
of individual, intentional, race-based conduct, which protects the inno-
sionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (some
internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)). For a discussion of the evolution of the intent
standard, see Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1154-60.
11. Professors Eisenberg and Johnson have nicely summarized the difficulty presented by
this standard:
Even if the discriminatory purpose standard reflects a correct view of what constitutes
discrimination-decisions made "because of' race-it may be a poor vehicle for identi-
fying instances of such decisions. Several commentators have argued that sophisticated
discriminators will conceal their purposes. Drawing on developing social science data
concerning the prevalence and manifestations of unconscious racism, recent writers
have contended that race-based decisionmaking is common, and have pointed out the
impossibility of adducing evidence that a decision was made "because of' race when
the decisionmaker himself is unaware that race influenced his choice.
Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1161 (footnotes to commentary on intent standard
omitted).
12. See Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION 596 (1967) (A former prosecutor
concluded that "[e]very lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is
commonplace."); see also Maclin, supra note 1, at 379-86 (discussing effects of police perjury on
Fourth Amendment doctrine).
13. See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1153 ("The Supreme Court's [intent] stan-
dard takes its toll not through an unusually high loss rate for those plaintiffs reaching trial or
appeal, but by deterring victims from even filing claims.").
14. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a) (requiring unanimous verdict); In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358,
363-64 (1970) (holding that the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for
convictions).
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cent state actor by allowing questionable, even probable, cases of ra-
cist conduct to escape sanction. 15
Whether we should require proof of a discriminatory intent is an
important, but at the moment, not a very practical question. The re-
quirement is firmly fixed in the law, judges seem at least passably
comfortable applying it,16 and neither the Supreme Court nor legisla-
tors has shown much interest in changing it.17 So if the Court is seri-
ous about eradicating the remnants of racism in the justice system,
and if the primary tool for the task-case-by-case challenges by de-
fendants-will continue to require a factual finding of discriminatory
intent, a more precise inquiry is required. Specifically, do the rules of
pretrial and trial practice fairly permit defendants to raise claims when
racist behavior occurs? Unfortunately, it appears they do not; in fact,
the rules appear to be making it harder, not easier, to uproot instances
of race-based decisionmaking.
15. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1163, 1164-65 (1978):
Courts have long regarded such inquiries [into the intent of governmental deci-
sionmakes] as unseemly .... The principle concern here is not that tender judicial
sensibilities may be bruised, but that a judge's reluctance to challenge the purity of
other officials' motives may cause her to fail to recognize valid claims of racial discrimi-
nation even when the motives for governmental action are highly suspect.
Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 48 (Dover Publications 1991) (1881)
("If justice requires the fact to be ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no ground for refusing
to try.").
16. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (expressing confidence that it would not
impose undue judicial burden to require inquiry into prosecutor's subjective reasons for exercis-
ing peremptory strikes). Indeed, when the drafters of the Model Penal Code proposed a com-
prehensive change to the structure of the criminal law, they made "recklessness" the default
mens rea for substantive offenses, even though that standard requires an inquiry into the actor's
state of mind. See AMERICAN LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3), (2)(c) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962).
17. There are strong practical and intuitive reasons for continuing to require proof of intent.
Unfavorable consequences that merely correlate with race-the disproportionate number of Af-
rican Americans who are arrested and convicted of crimes, for example, see supra note 9-may
be partly attributed to racism, but may also be explained by dozens of other factors. Poverty,
lack of education, and the involvement of other family members in crime probably have great
explanatory power for the overlap between race and crime, and thus, granting relief based on a
disparate racial impact could be to provide a constitutional remedy for problems that have no
constitutional grounding. For a variety of interesting perspectives on the intent requirement, see
Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 397; Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 99-156 (1977); Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 2; Larry G. Simon,
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978).
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III. THE IMPACT OF REQUIRING INTENT
"Racism in the criminal justice system hides behind discretion,"' 8
which means that the opportunity for racist conduct exists at every
stage of the process. Police cannot investigate every situation that
might result in criminal activity, nor can they (or should they) arrest
every person who has committed a technical violation of the law.19
Separation of powers concerns mean prosecutors have enormous lee-
way in deciding whom and what to charge, just as they have great
control over the pretrial process and plea bargaining. 20 Juries have
unfettered discretion in reaching a verdict, and the review of a guilty
verdict will be highly deferential. 21 There are enormous social bene-
fits to such a discretionary system, but the price of this discretion is
giving state actors a nearly uninterrupted chance to make illegitimate
judgments based on race.
The potential for abuse is especially high when decisions are
made outside the public eye. This part will focus on three of those
points: (1) when police detain a person for investigation; (2) when
prosecutors decide whether to charge and which charges to file; and
(3) when the jury decides which people are worthy of condemnation.
At each stage the potential for race-based decisionmaking is acute,
but the defendant's ability to prove the influence of race is at its
lowest.
18. Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Color-
blindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1808 (1993).
19. For a discussion of the problems and opportunities created by police discretion, see
Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and
Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REv. 442
(1990); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551 (1997).
20. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (noting prosecutors have
broad discretion to decide which charges to bring); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65
(1978) (noting prosecutors have broad authority to structure plea bargains). See generally Heck-
ler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (noting that prosecutorial function is "special province"
of executive branch).
21. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment ("[N]or shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy." U.S. CONsT. Amend. V.), if a jury
returns a verdict of not guilty, neither the trial judge nor a court of appeals can overturn that
decision. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). A reviewing court may overturn a
jury's decision to convict, but that review will be highly deferential: on appeal the court normally
will not reweigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Instead, it will view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, and will affirm the conviction if a rational
jury could have convicted on the evidence presented. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
80 (1942).
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A. Police Investigations
Consider David, a twenty-one-year-old African-American stu-
dent. One night while driving from campus to his apartment on the
other side of town, David is pulled over by the police. The officers tell
David that he was stopped because he failed to turn on his directional
signal at least thirty feet before making a turn. David is suspicious of
this explanation-the trivial reason for the stop, coupled with the po-
lice officer's tone of voice and demeanor, lead David to suspect that
the real reason he was stopped is that he is a Black man driving
through a White neighborhood in a flashy red car. He expects that the
traffic stop is simply a prelude to efforts by the police to search his car
for contraband.
David has reason to be concerned. While empirical data are hard
to come by, there is a strong belief in many communities that young
minority men are much more likely than White men to be suspected,
stopped, searched, and detained for trivial or non-existent reasons.22
Stories about Black men being pulled over while driving in White
neighborhoods (for the crime of "DWB," driving while Black23), or
being stopped because their cars and appearance lead the police to
suspect that the driver is involved with drugs, are sufficiently wide-
spread and credible to lend some validity to this belief.24
The reported cases probably under-represent the extent of the
problem. Innocent citizens who are improperly stopped and searched
may not complain through official channels, choosing instead to dis-
miss the encounter as an unfortunate fact of life.25 Those who are
22. The most active scholar on the subject of "pretext stops"-where the reason offered by
the police for a stop (usually a minor traffic offense) is simply an excuse to confront the driver
and perhaps search the car-is Professor David Harris. Although Harris acknowledges the lack
of "systematically gathered and analyzed data" on the frequency and nature of pretext stops, he
thinks there is no doubt that "pretextual stops [have been and] will be used against African
Americans and Hispanics in percentages wildly out of proportion to their numbers in the driving
population." David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546 (1997).
Professor Harris bases his conclusion on the many stories and the few court cases that have
focused on this issue. For a survey of the available evidence that race influences police decisions
to stop, see id. at 560-73.
23. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, THE NEw
YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 59; see also Harris, supra note 22, at 546 & n.10.
24. For a collection of stories involving traffic stops attributed to race, see Michael A.
Fletcher, Driven to Extremes; Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops, THE WASH. POST,
Mar. 29, 1996, at Al.
25. See Don Jackson, Police Embody Racism To My People, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1989, at
A25.
[In the view of a Black police sergeant] the police have long been the greatest nemesis
of Blacks, irrespective of whether we are complying with the law or not. We have
learned that there are cars we are not supposed to drive, streets we are not supposed to
19981
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improperly investigated, but who nevertheless are guilty of crimes,
may be induced to plead guilty to a lesser charge if any resulting evi-
dence from the stop is in danger of being suppressed; in clear cases of
an illegal search or seizure, the charges might be dropped entirely.
Even those who file a motion to suppress may not be vindicated, given
that defendants facing prison are incurable liars, and in a swearing
contest with police will usually lose.
As David anticipated, the police ask to search his car. When
David refuses, harsh words are exchanged and David becomes agi-
tated; as a result, the police become concerned that David might pose
a threat to them, and so perform a protective search of the interior of
the car.26 The search reveals an illegal switchblade in the glove box,
and David is arrested. David remains convinced, however, that the
entire sequence of events was racially motivated, and he asks his law-
yer whether he can challenge the weapons charge on the ground that
the real reason the police pulled him over in the first place was his
race. David believes (plausibly enough, for a non-lawyer) that if he
can show that the police virtually never enforce directional-signal vio-
lations, and that the officer's real motive was to investigate this "suspi-
cious" Black driver, he would have a defense to any charges that
flowed from the improper stop. 2 7
Whatever validity such a claim would have had before 1996, it has
little viability today. In Whren v. United States,28 two young African-
American men were driving in a Nissan Pathfinder with temporary
plates through a high-crime area of Washington, D.C. A team of
plainclothes vice officers patrolling for drug activity saw the Path-
finder sitting at a stop sign for more than twenty seconds, and noticed
that the driver was "not paying full time and attention" to his driving,
walk. We may still be stopped and asked "Where are you going, boy?" Whether we're
in a Mercedes or a Volkswagen.
Id.
26. The police may make a protective search of a car's interior if they have a reasonable
suspicion that the driver presents a danger and may gain control of a weapon. See Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
27. Cf. United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332, 339 (D. Colo. 1990) (finding that deci-
sion to stop defendant's car based on alleged weaving in traffic a pretext, and real reason was an
out-of-state license plate and the race of the occupants; evidence discovered incident to pretext
stop suppressed). See generally United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 1989)
(discussing background of pretext stop claims: "[t]he subject of pretextual arrests presents some
of the most intriguing historical, conceptual and practical issues in the often problematic area of
fourth amendment jurisprudence.").
28. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). For a useful discussion of the legal background to the Whren
decision, see David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 271; Craig M. Glantz, Note, "Could" this be the End of Fourth
Amendment Protections for Motorists?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 864, 865-74 (1997).
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a violation of D.C. traffic laws.29 Although police regulations speci-
fied that plainclothes officers were to enforce traffic laws only when
the violation posed a danger to the public, 30 the officers thought it
prudent to stop the Pathfinder. 31 When they did, they saw that the
passenger (Michael Whren) was holding two large plastic bags of
crack cocaine. 32
One of the telling features of Whren was how casual the arresting
officers were about acknowledging their motives. The plainclothes of-
ficers practically admitted that they had no interest in enforcing the
traffic laws or giving the driver a ticket;33 they were simply looking for
drug activity and saw a situation that made them suspicious. While
this suspicion alone did not permit the temporary seizure of Whren
and his companion, the traffic violation did. Interestingly, neither the
district court, the court of appeals, nor the Supreme Court disputed
the defendants' claim that the traffic stop was simply a pretext to in-
vestigate for drugs. The arresting officer denied, however, that de-
fendants' race had a played a role in the decision to stop the vehicle,
and there was no evidence introduced at the suppression hearing to
the contrary. 34
Critically, however, the Supreme Court appeared ready to uphold
the traffic stop even if there were evidence that race had played a role
in the officers' decision. In their briefs the defendants pointed out
that every driver violates some traffic regulation at some point, a fact
which gives the police boundless discretion to stop any driver they
29. Id. at 1772; see 18 D.C. Mun. Regs. § 2213.4 (1995) ("An operator shall, when operating
a vehicle, give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle."). The plainclothes officers
testified at the suppression hearing that the driver and passenger were looking at their laps while
at the stop sign. See Petitioner's Brief at 4, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841) (citing suppression hearing transcript).
30. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775 (quoting Metropolitan Police Department-Washington,
D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992))
("[Pilainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles [may] enforce traffic laws 'only in the case of a
violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others."'). At the sup-
pression hearing the officers did not claim that the defendants' vehicle was creating a hazard by
its delay at the stop sign. One of the officers testified that there was a car behind the Pathfinder
at the stop sign, but acknowledged that the trailing driver did not honk the horn or otherwise
express impatience. The other officer testified there was no car behind the Pathfinder. See Peti-
tioner's Brief at 4-5.
31. As the officers made a U-turn to approach the defendants, the Pathfinder quickly
turned right without signaling and drove off at an "unreasonable" speed. See Petitioner's Brief
at 5-6 (citing suppression hearing transcript). The officers cited these violations as additional
reasons for the stop. See id. at 6-7. The defendants did not dispute these facts, nor did they
dispute that the police had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. See
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
32. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
33. See Petitioner's Brief at 6-7.
34. See id. at 4.
1998]
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choose.35 This discretion, they argued, created an unacceptable risk
that the decisions to stop would be based on factors such as race. But
even if race did motivate the stop, the Court made it clear that this
evidence was irrelevant. "Subjective intentions," it said unanimously,
"play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis. "36
Although Whren was nominally about the contours of the Fourth
Amendment, the decision undeniably makes it easier for the police to
engage in race-based behavior.37 Just as importantly, there is no rea-
son to think that the reasoning in Whren will be limited to traffic
stops. Assume that instead of driving home from campus, David was
walking through an all-White neighborhood when the police decided
to perform a Terry stop.38 Once again, the officers' attitude and ques-
tions lead David to suspect that race played a role in the detention
decision, and once again, there are reasons for David to be concerned.
Terry stops have been criticized on a variety of grounds, many of
which are independent of race.39 But there have been sharp criticisms
in recent years that the open-ended authority granted by Terry is
abused with respect to decisions to stop and frisk Black suspects.40
Again, it is hard to know the extent to which these claims are true-
35. See id. at 17-19 (noting that almost half of all drivers monitored violated 55 mph speed
limit); Harris, supra note 22, at 545. Illinois traffic laws illustrate the discretion police officers
have to stop drivers. See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-601 (West 1993) (drivers have duty to
decrease speed when approaching a hill crest); 5/11-606 (may not drive so slow as to impede
"normal and reasonable movement of traffic"); 5/11-710(a) (may not follow another vehicle
"more closely than is reasonable and prudent"); 5/11-804(b) (must use directional signal at least
100 feet before turning in business and residential areas, at least 200 feet in other areas); see also
United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding validity of traffic stop where
police had followed "suspicious" car for a distance, then pulled car over when it drifted over
right-hand fog line for 5-10 seconds; claim of pretext rejected).
36. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
37. For a thoughtful commentary on the impact of Whren and other Supreme Court cases
on minority citizens, see Sklansky, supra note 28, at 308-23.
38. These stops are named after the case that approved them, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). Terry gives police the authority to briefly detain a suspect without probable cause if the
officer has a "reasonable suspicion" that the suspect has been involved in a crime. See generally
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5 (3d ed. 1996).
39. For criticisms of Terry which include, but are not limited to the problem of race, see,
e.g., George E. Dix, Nonarrrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 849; Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 715 (1994); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The
Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990).
40. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 140-63 (describing use of race to establish suspicion
of involvement in crime); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 669-81 (1994) (describing how case law per-
mits, even encourages, disproportionate number of stops of minorities); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); see also, LAFAVE, supra note
38, at 14 ("For many of those who honestly oppose Supreme Court recognition of the power of
police to stop and frisk, the central point is that police often have utilized street encounters for
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young Black men commit a disproportionate number of crimes, 41 so
we would expect them to be disproportionately targeted for Terry
stops as well. But there is some scholarly support and strong anecdo-
tal evidence to suggest that in a non-trivial number of cases, race influ-
ences the officer's decision on whom to stop and who might be
dangerous. 42 The question again is whether these suspects have the
ability to challenge the stop by presenting evidence of the officer's
improper motives.
We might think that a court system committed to eradicating ra-
cism would be keenly interested in allegations that police were basing
Terry stops on skin color. But some courts apparently would find that
evidence irrelevant, even pre-Whren. In United States v. McKie, for
example, the defendant claimed that the vial of crack that was recov-
ered from his pocket should be suppressed because the police lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him.43 As evidence, the defend-
ant pointed to the suppression hearing testimony of the detaining of-
ficer, who failed to offer any grounds to justify the stop; he simply
acknowledged that he had planned to detain the defendant until his
partner could investigate another suspect. While the court admitted
that this explanation was "quite summary," it still affirmed the convic-
tion. "The Terry standard being one of objective reasonableness,"
said the court, "we are not limited to what the stopping officer says or
to evidence of his subjective rationale; rather, we look to the record as
improper purposes, such as the wholesale harassment of minority groups and Blacks in particu-
lar." (footnote omitted, collecting sources)).
41. See Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 9.
42. There is no shortage of anecdotal evidence regarding the use of race in the decision to
perform Terry stops. For a personal and poignant description, see Paul Butler, "Walking while
Black;" Encounters With the Police on My Street, LEGAL TuMEs, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23; see also
Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual but Contin-
ual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567, 567-71 (1991) (describing an incident of a race-
based stop); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 250-62 (1991)
(describing instances of improper stops by police of Black males).
Although empirical evidence of this problem is harder to gather, there has been valuable
research done on the extent to which race is likely to influence decisionmaking. For example,
Professors Nancy King and Sheri Lynn Johnson have each explored the impact of race on crimi-
nal law juries. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611 (1985); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects
of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH L. REV. 63 (1993). Their review of the social science
literature (among other things), strongly suggests that people's predictions of guilt, truthfulness,
and dangerousness can all be influenced by the race of the decisionmaker and the alleged perpe-
trator. See Johnson, supra, at 1625-43; King, supra, at 77-99. While in many respects police
officers are differently situated than potential jurors-they presumably are more sophisticated
when it comes to evaluating suspects-it would be remarkable if the police were not influenced
by the same stereotypes and biases that are present in the rest of society.
43. See 951 F.2d 399, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
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a whole to determine what facts were known to the officer and then
consider whether a reasonable officer in those circumstances would
have been suspicious. '44
The Supreme Court has recognized that traffic stops and Terry
stops are conceptually similar,45 making it fair to assume that after
Whren, it will be increasingly difficult to challenge not only race-based
traffic stops, but Terry stops on a sidewalk or in a bus station as well.
As long as there is an objective basis on which the officer could have
formed the requisite reasonable suspicion, it would seem to be almost
impossible for a suspect to present evidence that racial bias infected
the officer's thinking, even if the allegation is true. 46
44. Id. at 402 (citation omitted). The court concluded that because the defendant had been
seen in the presence of an alleged drug dealer who was in the process of conducting business,
and had briefly ridden in the dealer's car where the drugs were reportedly stored, the police had
objectively reasonable grounds for the Terry stop. See id.
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. In State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 392
(N.D. 1995), for example, the officer admitted he did not have reasonable suspicion to believe
that any crime or traffic violation had occurred when he approached a parked pickup truck. The
court upheld the resulting Terry stop of the driver, noting that "the reasonable-and-articulable-
suspicion standard is objective, and it does not hinge upon the subjective beliefs of the arresting
officer." Id. And while the court stopped short of saying that an officer's state of mind would
never be relevant, it quoted the familiar language from the Supreme Court's opinion in Mary-
land v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985): "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has oc-
curred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time,' . . . not on the officer's actual state of mind at the
time the challenged action was taken." Hawley, 540 N.W.2d at 392 (internal citation omitted)).
45. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-83 (1975) (analogizing traffic
stops to Terry stops).
46. The problem is compounded by courts that make evidence of the officer's racial bias
irrelevant, but permit testimony on how the suspect's race legitimately informed the detention
decision. Although race standing alone is never a legitimate grounds for a Terry stop, a few
courts have found that race is one of many factors that the police may consider. See, e.g., United
States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding race of airline passenger legiti-
mate consideration in decision to detain, where drug couriers bringing cocaine into city are fre-
quently Black gang members); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding
presence of a person of one race in an area where such a person would not be expected to be can
inform officer's reasonable-suspicion calculation).
More commonly, in deciding whether the police had reasonable suspicion to justify a stop,
some courts have found it probative that the suspect was present in a high crime area, see United
States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995); that the suspect had a criminal record or was re-
puted to be a criminal, see United States v. Withers, 972 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1992). But see State v.
Beasley, 674 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (noting that the fact that suspect is a "known
offender" not grounds for stop); or, that the suspect acted furtively when he saw the police, see
United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1993); cf. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67
(1968) ("[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of... law officers are strong
indicia of mens rea."); see also Harris, supra note 40, at 660 ("A substantial body of law now
allows police officers to stop an individual based on just two factors: presence in an area of high
crime activity, and evasive behavior."). There is no doubt that each of these factors made it
more likely than criminal behavior is afoot, but there also is no doubt that these factors can mask
a police officer's decision to stop a suspect because of his race. Many urban Blacks live in high
crime districts, and it is no secret that young African Americans are disproportionately likely to
have had a prior entanglement with the justice system. For these and other reasons, it can hardly
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Perhaps recognizing the broad implications of Whren, the Court
took pains to limit its decision to the Fourth Amendment, noting that
it was simply deciding whether the traffic stop in question was "rea-
sonable. '47 "We of course agree," said the Court, "that the Constitu-
tion prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting
to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. '48
There are several problems with the Whren court's view. First, it
is far from clear that the exclusionary rule applies to an equal protec-
tion violation. 49 While it seems likely that David would have a de-
fense to the traffic stop if he could prove improper intent-and
perhaps a defense to the weapons charge that resulted from the pat
down-the Court has pointedly left open the issue of what remedy a
defendant is entitled to in this context.50 The second problem is that
even if Fourth Amendment rules can be imported into the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, it is qualitatively harder to prove a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. Demonstrating that the police stopped Black
motorists in situations where they would not have stopped White mo-
torists probably requires proof of police conduct over time,51 a show-
be a surprise that if police can consider flight or distrustful behavior in their presence, a higher
number of Black citizens will be detained.
47. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
48. Id.
49. Compare United States v. Jennings, 985 F.2d 562, 1993 WL 5927, at **4 (6th Cir. Jan. 13,
1993) (suggesting in dicta that if a defendant was chosen by police for consensual encounter
based on his race, the exclusionary rule should apply; "evidence seized in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause should be suppressed"); with id. at **7 (concurring opinion) (finding that au-
thority cited by court provides "absolutely no support for the majority's position" on this point)
and United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting equal protection chal-
lenge, noting in dicta that "defendant in this case argues that the exclusionary rule should apply,
even though that rule usually applies only to violations of the Fourth Amendment."), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 738 (1996). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960) (using
supervisory power to reject silver platter doctrine, noting in dicta that "surely no distinction can
logically be drawn between evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that
obtained in violation of the Fourteenth").
50. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 n.2 (1996) ("We have never deter-
mined whether dismissal of the indictment, or some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a
court determines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his race.").
51. A defendant raising an equal protection challenge to discriminatory police stops would
have to show that the stops were based on race, and that other, similarly situated White drivers
were not being stopped. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. The need to present evidence of police
practices in other cases is strongly suggested by the observation that "[a] defendant may demon-
strate that the administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively against a particular
class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive' that the system of prosecution
amounts to 'a practical denial' of equal protection of the law." Id. at 1486 (citation omitted); see
also id. at 1489 (rejecting defendant's allegations for lack of evidence, and noting that "respon-
dents could have investigated whether similarly situated persons of other races were prosecuted
by the State of California").
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ing that most indigent defendants and hard-pressed defense counsel
simply cannot make. Indeed, when a civil suit alleging an improper
arrest was brought against the city of Reynoldsburg, Ohio in 1993, the
eventual settlement was at least in part the product of police depart-
ment admission that it had a group of officers on the force that re-
ferred to itself as "SNAT"-Special Nigger Arrest Team.52 Whether
the plaintiff could have prevailed in the absence of that admission is
far from clear.
Finally, the Court's suggestion that there are other constitutional
avenues for attacking a pretextual stop is questionable in light of a
decision reached just two years earlier. In Albright v. Oliver,53 the
Court rejected a claim that defendants have a substantive due process
right to be free of arrest except on probable cause. While no opinion
in Oliver commanded a majority, there was a consensus for the view
that defendants who objected to the illegal arrest had to proceed
under the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause.54 In par-
ticular, the Court noted the limits of relying on the Fourteenth
Amendment in criminal cases:
[our case law] has substituted, in these areas of criminal procedure,
the specific guarantees of the various provisions of the Bill of rights
embodied in the first 10 Amendments to the Constitution for the
more generalized language contained in the earlier cases construing
the Fourteenth Amendment .... Where a particular amendment
"provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection"
against a particular sort of government behavior, "that Amend-
ment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process'
must be the guide for analyzing these claims."
... [Here t]he Framers considered the matter of pretrial depriva-
tions of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.55
Whren says the Fourth Amendment is unavailable to defendants
like David but the Equal Protection Clause might be; Oliver says that
when the Fourth Amendment covers the practice in question (e.g.,
traffic stops), it is the exclusive source of relief. And so while there
are strong counter-arguments that neither Oliver nor Whren fore-
closes an equal protection claim for race-based stops by police, the
combination of cases casts doubt on whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides a meaningful weapon in the battle to uncover biased
police practices.
52. See Fletcher, supra note 24, at Al.
53. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
54. See id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 273-74 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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B. Decisions to Prosecute
After his arrest, David tells his lawyer that he is anxious to get his
case resolved before he is drawn too far into the criminal system. De-
fense counsel is reassuring: in this jurisdiction, she says, charges like
carrying an illegal knife are routinely dropped, particularly when
there was no harm done and the arrestee turns out to have no criminal
record. David is not convinced; he fears that the same attitude and
practices that led to his original stop and arrest will carry over to the
prosecutor's charging decision, and that the district attorney will be
less forgiving of Black arrestees than he would be of Whites.
David has reason to be concerned. There have been frequent al-
legations that district attorneys are more likely to investigate and
charge Blacks than Whites for similar conduct;56 that Blacks are likely
to be charged with more serious crimes than their White counterparts;
and that Blacks who violate both state and federal law are more likely
to be diverted into the federal system where the sentences are
harsher.57
56. The claims of selective charging have been particularly acute when the criminal accusa-
tions are leveled against Black public officials. In a 1992 article recounting the frequency of such
charges, the A.B.A. Journal offered the following information:
A 1990 study by the National Council of Churches shows that more than 14 percent of
the public corruption cases over the past five years targeted Black officials, who make
up less than two percent of the country's elected officials. In the South, where three
percent of all elected officials are Black, the study found that 40 percent of public cor-
ruption cases were pursued against Blacks.
Though less than one-half of one percent of the federal judiciary is Black, three of the
five U.S. District Court judges indicted in the past decade were Black.
In 1990, 77 percent of Black respondents to a poll conducted by the New York Times
said they believed that "the government deliberately singles out and investigates Black
elected and appointed officials in order to discredit them in a way it doesn't do with
White officials." Thirty-four percent of the Whites responding also believed that such
selective prosecution "could be going on."
Mark Curriden, Selective Prosecution: Are Black Officials Investigative Targets?, 78 A.B.A. J. 54,
55 (1992). Even the president of the National District Attorney's Association admitted that
"while I do not believe that Blacks are being selectively prosecuted, I certainly can understand
how such a theory is gaining popularity." Id.
57. There has been little systematic study of the problem. Claims of race-based prosecution
are raised infrequently in the reported cases, and when they are raised, usually fail. See, e.g.,
Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 1995) (noting defendant introduced statistical evidence to
support unsuccessful claim that prosecutors more likely to seek mandatory life sentences against
Black drug dealers than against White dealers); see also Joseph L. Gastwirth & Tapan K. Nayak,
Statistical Aspects of Cases Concerning Racial Discrimination in Drug Sentencing: Stephens v.
State and U.S. v. Armstrong, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 583, 587-96 (1997) (discussing
Stephens). The statistical studies that have been conducted lend some credence to the allega-
tions, although the authors are careful to note the limits of their research and the risks of genera-
lizing. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc. REV. 587, 615-19 (1985) (concluding that race of victim and de-
fendant influenced decisions to "upgrade" degree of homicide charged); see also P.S. Kane,
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This was the claim before the Supreme Court in United States v.
Armstrong,58 where an African-American defendant moved to dismiss
the charges of possession of crack cocaine, alleging that Blacks were
being selectively prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney's Office.59 Arm-
strong had only paltry evidence to support this allegation,60 but the
claim apparently struck a chord with the trial judge, who ordered the
government to provide discovery on the issue. When the government
refused, arguing that it was legally improper and strategically unwise
to give defendants access to the prosecutor's thoughts on charging de-
cisions, the judge dismissed the charges.61
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendants had failed
to make the threshold showing of racial bias that would entitle them
to discovery. While continuing to insist on proof of intentional dis-
crimination to prove vindictive prosecution, the Court now made the
proof of discriminatory intent merely inaccessible, rather than inad-
missible. To gain access to the prosecutor's files, said the Court, there
must be a significant preliminary showing of bias;62 but of course,
without the access it is nearly impossible to show the bias needed to
gain the access. And so while there are good reasons to extend prose-
cutors great charging discretion, there is no doubt that Armstrong
Comment, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion for Selective
Prosecution, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2293, 2295-2300 (1993) (summarizing studies on disparate charging
of minorities).
Despite the scarcity of hard data, the claims continue to be widely advanced. See, e.g., supra
note 56. Even the former United States Solicitor General, while denying that the evidence
shows improper charging, has noted that "there appears to be a significant disparity between the
percentage of African Americans who use illicit drugs in a given year and those arrested for drug
crimes who are African American." Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal Criminal Justice
System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 181, 186-87 (1996) (footnote
omitted).
58. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
59. Armstrong claimed that Black defendants' cases were being diverted to federal court
where the mandatory sentences for drug crimes were more severe, while similarly situated White
defendants were being allowed to proceed in the state courts. See id. at 460-61.
60. The only evidence offered in support of the allegation was an affidavit by a paralegal,
attached to which was a study of the disposition of 24 other drug defendants. See id. at 459.
Even Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, acknowledged that defendants proffered evidence "was
not strong enough to give them a right to discovery, either under Rule 16 or under the District
Court's inherent power to order discovery in appropriate circumstances." Id. at 477 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
61. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the dismissal of the
charges, finding that the discovery order directed at the U.S. Attorney's office was proper. See
United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1995).
62. See 517 U.S. at 464-65, 469-70.
[Vol. 73:559
OBJECTIVE TESTS AND SUBJECTIVE BIAS
cripples a defendant's ability to attack race-based decisionmaking
when it occurs.63
Armstrong may be the most visible barrier to uncovering discrim-
inatory charging decisions, but it is not the only one. Suppose the
prosecutor in David's case became convinced that the original stop
and arrest were in fact motivated by race, and thinks that the best
course of action is to dismiss this case in a hurry. She is worried, how-
ever, that David is going to sue the police and the city over the event,
so she offers him a deal: all criminal charges will be dropped if David
will sign an agreement not to bring a civil action arising from the
arrest.
64
"Release-dismissal" agreements are controversial devices that
can force a defendant to choose between going to jail and vindicating
a civil rights claim. These agreements are often highly attractive to
the parties involved. Defendants might be happy enough to have the
criminal charges dropped; they at least want the choice to drop both
cases rather than be forced to go forward on each. 65 The government
also has a great deal to gain from the arrangement. Civil suits,
whether meritorious or not, are costly, diverting, and embarrassing
events in the lives of public officials, and there are powerful argu-
ments for resolving disputes between the government and citizens
quickly and efficiently. The problem, of course, is that these agree-
ments are designed to ensure that neither the alleged crime nor the
alleged civil misdeeds are ever exposed and remediated. 66
The ability to mask race-based decisionmaking through release-
dismissal agreements is shown in the well-known case of Dixon v. Dis-
63. Armstrong is worth a good deal more discussion than has been given here. For a more
detailed analysis of the case, see Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discov-
ering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605 (1998).
64. A typical civil rights claim in this context might allege that the arrest was based on an
improper stop or search, or the use of excessive force by the police. For a discussion of the types
of police behavior that can give rise to claims under the various civil rights statutes, see National
Lawyer's Guild, POLICE MISCONDuCr § 2.1 to § 2.3 (1995).
65. Defendants will not always be pleased to have the choice. There may be some cases in
which a person's civil rights are violated that the police or prosecutor will invent a charge, or will
increase the severity of the crime charged simply to give the government something to bargain
away in return for the dropped civil suit. In such cases, the availability of the release-dismissal
agreements could put defendants in a worse position than they would otherwise face. See also
infra note 76 (describing additional dangers of release-dismissal agreements).
66. For an overview of the effects of release-dismissal agreements, see Brian L. Fielkow, 42
U.S.C. § 1983-Buying Justice: The Role of Release-Dismissal Agreements in the Criminal Justice
System, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (1988); Elizabeth Pascale Francis, Note, Trading
Civil Rights Claims for Dismissal of Criminal Charges: Release-Dismissal Agreements, 17 STET-
SON L. REV. 491 (1988).
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trict of Columbia.67 Miller Dixon was an African-American driver
pulled over by two White officers for obstructing traffic. 68 To the un-
doubted dismay of the officers, Dixon turned out to be a retired detec-
tive sergeant, and after some apparent unpleasantness, Dixon was
released with no arrest made and no ticket issued. Two days later,
Dixon filed a complaint with the department concerning the White
officers' behavior. 69 Although until that point the government had
shown no interest in prosecuting the traffic violations, it now offered
not to proceed with the traffic charge as long as Dixon agreed to
forego his administrative action.
Maybe the government in Dixon was trying to cover up its own
misdeeds, maybe not. But if our goal is reducing official decisions in-
fluenced by race, the availability of these agreements is surely
counterproductive. Indeed, it was precisely because "these agree-
ments suppress complaints against police misconduct which should be
thoroughly aired in a free society" that the D.C. Circuit in Dixon con-
demned the use of release-dismissal agreements. 70 (Milton Dixon
changed his mind after entering into the agreement, and proceeded
with his complaint anyway.71) But when the Supreme Court finally
considered the validity of these agreements in Town of Newton v.
Rumery,72 it found that this interest was insufficient to overcome the
benefits of out-of-court settlements. And while the Court's holding
was narrow-it simply ruled that these agreements were not per se
67. 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
68. The reported opinions do not describe the events giving rise to the traffic stop or the
decision to charge. The events were not even clear to the Court of Appeals, which noted that
"we do not know the full story of the decision to prosecute appellant." Id. at 968.
69. Although the nature of the complaint is not specified, there is a suggestion that it in-
volved police brutality. See id. at 968 n.2.
70. See id. at 969; see also Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1985)
(stating that release-dismissal agreements "tempt prosecutors to trump up charges in reaction to
a defendant's civil rights claim, suppress evidence of police misconduct, and leave unremedied
deprivations of constitutional rights"), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
It is unclear whether "the court" in Dixon actually held that release-dismissal agreements
were impermissible. The quoted language is from the lead opinion written by Chief Judge
Bazelon. In addition to disapproving release-dismissal agreements, he found that it was an
abuse of prosecutorial discretion for the prosecutor to proceed with the charges against Dixon,
see 394 F.2d at 968; the two concurring judges agreed that the criminal charges should be dis-
missed, although they did not join Bazelon's opinion. See 394 F.2d at 971. Moreover, given that
the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia had already declared that release-dis-
missal agreements were improper, see id. at 969, there was no need for the D.C. Circuit to rule
on their validity except in deciding whether these particular charges should be dismissed.
71. See Dixon, 394 F.2d at 968. Not surprisingly, the traffic charges were filed soon thereaf-
ter. See id.
72. 480 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1987).
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invalid 73-its reasoning once again put a premium on objective con-
siderations in deciding whether to bar the civil rights claim.
Returning to David's case, assume that the prosecutor offered the
agreement immediately after the arrest, before the criminal charges or
misconduct claim had been thoroughly investigated.74 If David signs
and abides by the agreement, that ends the matter-the bias claim
disappears. Suppose, however, that after signing the agreement David
discovers that there is strong evidence to support his civil rights claim
(it turned out that his arresting officer was Mark Fuhrman, for exam-
ple 75), and seeks to void the contract. Although Rumery freely ac-
knowledges the risks of prosecutorial overreaching that attach to
these agreements,76 David would have a difficult time convincing a
court to hear his claim of biased decisionmaking.
To have his civil rights claim heard on the merits, David will first
have to persuade a court that the release-dismissal agreement is void.
Among the considerations courts will look at in considering the valid-
ity of the deal are the knowledge and experience of the defendant, the
severity of the criminal charges, and whether the defendant was ad-
vised by counsel when he agreed to waive his claim.77 Evidence that
race played a role in the arrest giving rise to the civil action would be
irrelevant at this stage, except to the extent that the prosecutor's mo-
tives for offering the agreement could be uncovered. Here the evi-
dence of racial bias would be relevant when the court considered if
there was a "legitimate criminal justice objective" for dropping the
73. See id. at 397.
74. Cf. id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Re-
lease-dismissal agreements are often reached between the prosecutor and defendant with little
or no judicial oversight."). Because leave of court is often needed to dismiss formal charges
after they have been filed, see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a), the incentive is to execute a release-
dismissal agreement soon after arrest.
75. As anyone who owned a television during 1995 will remember, Mark Fuhrman was the
Los Angeles detective who helped investigate the murder charges against football legend O.J.
Simpson. Fuhrman badly damaged the prosecution's case when it turned out that he had
bragged about mistreating Black suspects in other cases. See Kathryn Wexler, Witnesses Tell of
Fuhrman's Displays of Racial Animosity, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1995, at A2.
76. The dangers were recognized at several points in the opinions upholding Bernard
Rumery's agreement. The majority said "[w]e agree that some release-dismissal agreements
may not be the product of an informed and voluntary decision. The risk, publicity, and expense
of a criminal trial may intimidate a defendant, even if he believes his defense is meritorious."
480 U.S. at 393. A plurality also noted that "the Court of Appeals [in this case] . . . believed
these agreements 'tempt prosecutors to trump up charges in reaction to a defendant's civil rights
claim, suppress evidence of police misconduct, and leave unremedied deprivations of constitu-
tional rights.' We can agree that in some cases there may be a substantial basis for this concern."
Id. at 394 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
77. See id. at 401-02 (opinion of O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (outlining relevant considerations when assessing validity of release-dismissal
agreements).
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charges. 78 Even here, however, the courts can accept the desire to
"[s]par[e] the local community the expense of litigation associated
with some minor crimes for which there is little or no public interest in
prosecution" as a legitimate objective. 79 Given this interest will be
present in virtually all cases like David's, and given the obvious socie-
tal benefits that flow from reducing litigation, any allegation of racial
decisionmaking could have a hard time carrying the day.
The point is not that Rumery was wrongly decided, or that re-
lease-dismissal agreements do more social harm than good. The more
narrow point is simply that rules designed to streamline and simplify
the justice system often work at cross-purposes with the desire to de-
tect and correct race-based conduct. Release-dismissal agreements
provide a method for masking this conduct by buying a defendant's
silence, albeit at a price that may be enticing to the parties most di-
rectly involved.
The difficulties of proving improper conduct are not limited to
the initial charging decision. Indictments that were influenced by ra-
cial considerations are extremely hard to establish, in part because of
grand jury secrecy, and in part because objective considerations will
often moot the inquiry into the subjective parts of the process (more
on juries below). 80 The prosecutor's enormous control over the plea
bargaining process can also smooth over any race-based misconduct,
in much the same way that a release dismissal can. 81 While provable
cases of these types appear to be rare, these rules, when coupled with
the investigative rules discussed above, leave defendants with little
chance to expose the misconduct when it occurs.
78. See id. at 401.
79. See id. at 399-400. Perhaps recognizing the ease with which prosecutors could mask
their reasons for offering a release-dismissal agreement, the Third Circuit imposed an additional
requirement on the government. While continuing to recognize that the avoidance of civil suits
is a legitimate public interest, the court of appeals also requires proof that the proffered public
interest is in fact the reason the deal was offered. The court apparently will consider testimony
as to the prosecutor's state of mind that (for example) the agreement was offered simply as a
means for hiding a civil rights violation. See Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380-81 (3d Cir.
1993) (en banc); see also Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 527 (3d Cir.
1996) (explaining and applying Cain standard), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1311 (1997).
80. See infra Part III.C.
81. By inducing defendants to forego a public trial, plea bargains offer prosecutors the abil-
ity to mask problematic conduct by the police or other prosecutors in much the same way that
release-dismissal agreements can. Indeed, Rumery recognized the functional similarity between
plea bargains and these agreements. See 480 U.S. at 393. But cf. id. at 393 n.3 (noting that the
analogy between agreements and plea bargains is not complete).
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C. Juries
Following his arrest and charge, David asks his lawyer about his
pending jury trial. Although counsel believes there is a decent chance
at an acquittal, David is worried about the composition of his jury. He
knows that Blacks and other minorities tend to be under represented
in jury pools, 82 and he fears that if the jury is forced to choose be-
tween the testimony of a White police officer and a Black defendant,
the jury might either find the White witness inherently more credible,
or else assume that a Black man is guilty of something without bother-
ing to fully evaluate the evidence.
There is reason for David's concern. Whether it was freeing the
White defendants who murdered Emmett Till 83 or convicting Black
defendants who were falsely accused, history is littered with ugly inci-
dents of juries using their powers to disadvantage minorities. 84 The
situation is far better today than in the past, but it is by no means
trouble free. Cases involving the police officers who beat Rodney
King, the men who beat Reginald Denny, and other less notable de-
fendants85 strongly suggest that some cases continue to be tinged with
racial considerations that are unrelated to the evidence. Sophisticated
82. There is wide-spread agreement that racial minorities are often statistically under repre-
sented in the pools from which grand and trial jurors are drawn. See David Kairys et al., Jury
Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REv. 776, 803-04 (1977)
(table indicating disparity between percentage of racial minorities in community and percentage
in jury pools of between approximately 18% and 40%); Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Mun-
sterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-section by Design, 79 JUDICATURE 273, 273-74 (Mar.-
Apr. 1996) (The "[ilnability to secure racial and ethnic diversity on lists of qualified jurors re-
mains the most intractable problem in jury administration today.").
83. Emmett Till was a fifteen-year-old Black youth from Chicago who in 1955 went to visit
relatives in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi. On a dare, Till asked a White, married store cash-
ier for a date, and whistled at her. A few days later he was pistol-whipped, shot in the head, and
thrown in the river with a weight around his neck. Two White men were arrested, and the
evidence of their guilt was fairly strong (they admitted abducting Till, but claimed they had
released him unharmed). In its closing, the defense stated that despite the pressures by "outside
agitators," he was sure that "every last Anglo-Saxon one of you" would have the courage to free
the defendants. After one hour and seven minutes of deliberations, the jurors acquitted; as one
juror noted, "If we hadn't stopped to drink pop, it wouldn't have taken that long." The defend-
ants then sold their story of how they had killed Till to a newspaper. For a summary of the Till
case, see KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 60-62.
84. For a historical discussion on how juries (along with other government actors) often
used their powers to discriminate in the application of the criminal laws, see KENNEDY, supra
note 1, at 76-135; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704,
704-07 (1995).
85. See, e.g., Daniel Klaidman, Racial Politics in the Jury Room, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 23,
1990, at 1 (discussing a murder trial in Washington, D.C., where a Black defendant accused of
killing a Black victim is acquitted by an all-Black jury; post-verdict interviews suggest that ver-
dict was influenced by belief that justice system is stacked against African Americans, and by
some jurors' unwillingness to send another Black man to prison).
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scholarship has buttressed the view that race continues to influence
jurors, consciously or otherwise, in their deliberations. 86
The flashpoint in the debate over race and juries has been the
imposition of the death penalty.87 The now-famous Baldus Study,88
for example, offered empirical evidence that those who killed Whites
were more likely to be executed than those who killed Blacks, raising
an inference that jurors find the lives of White victims more valuable
than the lives of Black victims. While the methodology of the Baldus
study has been questioned, 89 it is telling that few observers are willing
to take the opposite view, and declare that race exerts no influence in
the handing out death sentences.
The Supreme Court's response to this evidence was, of course,
McCleskey v. Kemp,90 which upheld the validity of the Georgia sen-
tencing scheme that Professor Baldus and his colleagues studied. The
Court assumed the validity of the proffered statistics, but found that
they failed to prove the crucial question: that a particular jury inten-
tionally discriminated against a defendant who killed White victims.
At most, said the Court, the statistics showed a risk that race may
influence some jury decisions in some cases, but this risk fell short of
proving intentional discrimination against Warren McCleskey. 91
Here a defendant's ability to prove racial bias is not just reduced,
it is eliminated; the inquiry has been narrowed so that now even ob-
jective evidence that "some juries" in capital cases discriminate is
86. In her careful analysis of the influence of race on juries, Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson
concludes that a racial bias continues to influence the outcome of cases, even though much of it
appears to be unconscious rather than deliberate. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 1616-51. Pro-
fessor Nancy King has also noted the existence of some bias in her important article on the
subject. See King, supra note 42, at 77-105. The work of King and Johnson are confirmed by the
now-dated, but still leading, research on jury behavior, the Chicago Jury study. In that study,
Professors Kalven and Zeisel noted instances where the race of the victim or defendant affected
the decisions of largely White juries. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 340-41 (1966).
87. For a readable overview of the debate, see JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 207-39
(1994); see also MANN, supra note 1, at 200-19; Samual R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of
Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37
STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984).
88. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990). For a
discussion of other studies that have examined the impact of race on capital sentences, see John-
son, supra note 42, at 1622-23.
89. The district court which rejected McCleskey's claim that the Georgia death penalty
scheme was unconstitutional was particularly critical of the Baldus study. See McCleskey v.
Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 352-79 (N.D. Ga. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., McCles-
key v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), affd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The authors of
the study respond strongly to the criticisms in BALDUS, supra note 88, at app. B.
90. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
91. See id. at 308. The Court also rejected a claim that the statistics revealed a violation of
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 301-13.
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inadmissible. 92 The problem, however, is not really McCleskey, but
the rules on impeaching jury verdicts. Even if Warren McCleskey had
sworn statements from the actual jurors in his case, saying that they
and other members of the jury deliberately decided to sentence him to
death because McCleskey was Black and the victim was White, his
equal protection claim might well fail. The Federal Rules of Evidence
(and the rules of many states) disallow the post-trial impeachment of a
verdict if the challenge is based on the discussions that took place in
the jury room. 93 Unless the deliberations were infected by an outside
influence-bribes or threats by non-jurors, access to information that
was not admitted at trial-defendants may not use juror statements
about the deliberations to undermine the verdict, even if there were
clear agreement among the jurors that race was taken into account.94
The refusal to treat jurors like other government decisionmakers
extends to the pretrial and post-trial process as well. When grand ju-
rors decide to indict, any racial influence that affected their decision
will almost certainly remain hidden. Under the Costello Rule, as long
as the grand jury is fairly drawn, the return of a facially valid indict-
92. See BALDUS, supra note 88, at 370 (criticizing Court's opinion, noting "[b]y so limiting
capital punishment equal-protection claims, the Court in McCleskey created a nearly insuperable
barrier to proof").
93. FED. R. Evim. 606(b) provides in part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's
mental processes in connection therewith.
The rule goes on to say, however, that "a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court has construed this provision to mean that almost any influence of the jurors' own making
is off limits to a litigant seeking to undermine the verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.
107 (1987) (ruling allegations of drug and alcohol use by jurors inadmissible in proceeding to
impeach verdict).
94. Thus, as long as the racial bias came from the jurors themselves rather than from some
outside source (newspapers, for example) the fact that race played an explicit part in the verdict
would generally not be considered by a court. See, e.g., United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913
(5th Cir. 1980) (finding testimony concerning jurors' prejudices incompetent); Smith v. Brewer,
444 F. Supp. 482, 488-90 (S.D. Iowa) (holding where juror allegedly mimicked Black defendant's
manner of speaking, evidence of juror's behavior inadmissible), affd, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.
1978). And while some courts leave open the possibility of considering racial evidence that is so
severe as to render a verdict fundamentally unfair, see, e.g., Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155,
1158-59 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting evidence of racist statement by juror incompetent, but noting in
dicta that "[t]he rule of juror incompetency can not be applied in such an unfair manner as to
deny due process"), courts normally do not find the bias that severe. See e.g., id. at 1159-60. The
rule has been criticized by courts and commentators, but the incompetence of this type of testi-
mony appears to be the prevailing view. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
EVIDENCE 519 (1995); see also Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process: Racist
Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1597-1603 (1988) (citing
sources).
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ment will cure almost all problems that occurred in the process. 95
And while courts of appeals will examine verdicts to see if they were
influenced by passion, prejudice, or racial hostility, a defendant is
again foreclosed from providing direct evidence of bias. The review-
ing court will ask what the jury saw and heard, and will consider the
circumstances surrounding the trial, but will uphold the verdict if it
concludes that these factors would not have influenced reasonable ju-
rors.96 What courts will not do is remand for a hearing, so that the
jurors who heard the case can testify about what actually occurred.
Like the other rules discussed above, there are compelling rea-
sons for not questioning jurors about their decision.97 The cumulative
effect of these rules, however, is that a defendant can be pulled over
by a racist police officer, charged more seriously than other defend-
ants because of his race, offered a release-dismissal agreement before
charges are formalized to hide a civil rights violation, indicted by a
grand jury that thinks young Black males should be charged on gen-
eral principles, convicted by a jury that is more protective of White
interests than Black, and have his conviction affirmed despite claims
and statistics suggesting racial decisionmaking-all with hardly a word
of inquiry into the state of mind of the actor who made the decision.
The Supreme Court's commitment to ending the influence of race in
criminal trials may have been unceasing, but it surely has not been
unqualified.
IV. COMPETING INTERESTS AND REMEDIES
Criticizing is easy, offering helpful solutions is hard. Part II tried
to show how the problems with proving race-based decisionmaking
have a common origin; having bundled the problems together, the
temptation now is to seek a single remedy. But the problems of race
are too thorny, and the competing interests too weighty, to allow a
95. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). A distinction should be drawn
between improper comments by the prosecutor who is trying to prejudice the jury and improper
comments or considerations raised by the grand jurors themselves during deliberations. The
former could almost certainly be challenged, see Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643
(1974) (holding constitution prohibits prosecutors from making racially-biased arguments), while
the latter claim might well be barred by Costello. For a discussion on the scope of the Costello
rule, see 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.4(a) - (c),
§ 15.5(c), (g) (1984).
96. See generally Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (refusing to overturn conviction
despite evidence that jury might have been influenced by community prejudice toward defend-
ant in high-profile murder case; passage of time between crime and trial sufficient to rebut any
presumption of partiality).
97. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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sweeping solution. For legal and practical reasons, a more layered ap-
proach is required.
A. Competing Interests
Courts frequently justify limits on challenges to official discretion
by citing administrative concerns. 98 Motions to suppress evidence,
quash an indictment, or vacate a verdict are often cost-free to the de-
fendant, or if they are not free, bring with them such a significant re-
ward that the challenge is worth the cost. Courts are afraid that, like
any underpriced good, these challenges will be overused, putting a sig-
nificant resource burden on an already busy justice system. The re-
sponse has been to make claims easy to process, by making the
outcome turn on easily provable facts (was there a traffic violation?),
or by setting the defendant's burden of production so high that most
challenges can be dismissed without a hearing.
But while the administrative concerns are legitimate, the explana-
tion is unsatisfying. When problems of race have loomed large
enough in the past, the Court has been willing to intervene in the
criminal process despite the high resource costs. The best recent ex-
ample of this is Batson v. Kentucky:99 the practice of using peremp-
tory strikes to remove all potential Black jurors was so widespread
that the Court stepped in and added an expensive and time-consum-
ing constitutional requirement to the voir dire. 1°° Perhaps Batson is
98. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) (requiring rigorous stan-
dard for discovery for selective prosecution claims, in part because discovery requests divert
prosecutorial resources); Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1987) (recognizing release-
dismissal agreements can serve important role in protecting system and public officials from
burdensome claims); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (noting prosecutors
must have great discretion over charging decisions, because courts are not competent to second
guess how best to allocate scarce resources among high number of potential cases); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (noting challenges to indictments strongly disfavored,
inter alia, because of costs of resulting delay while challenges resolved). But cf Whren v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996) (noting decision not based solely, or even primarily, on
evidentiary difficulty of proving intent).
99. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
100. In Batson, the Court reaffirmed that the use of peremptory challenges to remove poten-
tial jurors because of their race violated equal protection, and made it significantly easier to
prove that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent. Specifically, although the defendant
still has the burden of proving an improper motive, he need only create a prima facie case of
discrimination to shift the burden on the prosecutor to explain how she had not intentionally
discriminated. See id. at 97-98. This model might profitably be used in other challenges involv-
ing race, as discussed infra at the text accompanying notes 142-46.
For a discussion on the use of race-based peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from
juries, see KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 193-230; Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge,
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 93-101 (1990).
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an anomaly, but a fair inference to draw from that case is that if the
Court believes that a racial problem is corrosive enough, administra-
tive concerns will be subordinated. 10 1 A corollary inference is that the
Court is not convinced that race-based decisionmaking remains a big
enough problem to justify opening the gates to large numbers of new
claims.
Although the size of the racial problem is difficult to quantify,
there has been no lack of effort to educate courts on the scope of the
problem. Parties and amicus curiae, often drawing on academic writ-
ing, routinely provide courts with facts and figures about the perni-
cious influence of race on law enforcement. 10 2 Judges and justices
have seemed largely unmoved by these data, leading some observers
to conclude that over the last quarter century, the Supreme Court (es-
pecially, but not uniquely) has been at least indifferent, and at most
hostile to claims of racial bias.'0 3
There is no doubt that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts gener-
ally view claims by all criminal defendants, including those who allege
discrimination, less favorably than the Warren Court did.10 4 But hos-
tility toward minority defendants is too blunt an explanation, one that
101. Cf William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987
Sup. CT. REV. 97, 155 ("If one wanted to understand how the American trial system for criminal
cases came to be the most expensive and time consuming in the world, it would be difficult to
find a better starting point than Batson.").
102. See, e.g., Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund & American Civil Liber-
ties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, United States v. Armstrong 517 U.S.
456 (1996) (No. 95-157) (citing books, law review articles, and court studies on racism in the
justice system); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Peti-
tioners, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841) (citing law review articles).
103. See, e.g., Angela Davis, Conference on Race, Law, and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and
the American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 639-41 (1996); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Un-
derstanding the Racial Discourse of Justice Rehnquist, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 599-600 (1994);
Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1267, 1270-73, 1310-22
(1992).
104. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME
COURT 317-18 (1992):
During the Earl Warren era, the liberal majority often agreed to hear appeals from
convicted criminals and used their cases to rewrite the standards for criminal proce-
dures.... In the Rehnquist Court the process worked in reverse. The conservative
majority rarely agreed to hear an appeal from a criminal whose conviction was upheld
by a state or federal court. However, when the prosecutors lost a case in the lower
courts, the Rehnquist Court could be counted on to hear the appeal filed by a state of
the Justice Department .... Where the Warren Court gave a second chance to con-
victed criminals, the Rehnquist Court gave prosecutors a second chance to affirm
convictions.
It is worth noting, however, that some of the decisions that created great problems for African-
American suspects, including Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) discussed supra in Part III.A, were
products of the Warren Court. See also supra note 131 (discussing Warren-Court era decision in
Swain v. Alabama, making it more difficult to prove that prosecutor used peremptory strikes to
deny Black defendants equal protection; later overruled by Burger Court in Batson v. Kentucky).
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brings the search for answers to a jarring halt: if the Justices are bi-
ased, the only solution is hand wringing and waiting for the passage of
years to bring about a new Court. But there is a more refined expla-
nation for this judicial attitude, one that fits more comfortably with
the case law. This explanation has two parts. The first involves the
nature of common-law decisionmaking. The second involves the
Court's optimistic, perhaps unrealistic, view of criminal juries.
The Supreme Court has extensively constitutionalized criminal
procedure, finding in the Bill of Rights detailed rules allowing a
search of the glove compartment but not the trunk of a car,10 5 rules
that make the admissibility of confessions turn on whether the defend-
ant or the police initiated a conversation, 1°6 and rules defining what
evidence can and must be admitted at the sentencing phase of a capi-
tal trial.10 7 These rules were typically constructed to provide guidance
to police and judges in circumstances where legislators had been si-
lent. But as necessary as these steps were for the orderly administra-
tion of justice, they appear to have conditioned both judges and
lawmakers to think of pretrial criminal procedure as principally a mat-
ter of constitutional common law development, rather than a subject
of legislative primacy with interstitial judicial rulings.10 8
Judicial primacy has come at a cost. Appellate courts-those
most responsible for the rulemaking-see only the guilty who have
been caught with the goods; they never see the many innocent citizens
who are improperly stopped and then released, and rarely hear the
stories of White defendants who receive relatively more favorable
treatment by juries or prosecutors. While appellate judges can read
briefs about disparate treatment or suspicionless stops, they never
hold legislative hearings or read mail from constituents, and so they
105. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 & n.4 (1981) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment permits the search of automobile incident to a lawful arrest; search may include
"glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger
compartment," but may not include the trunk).
106. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that once accused re-
quests assistance of counsel, any further information obtained by police in absence of counsel is
inadmissible unless accused initiated communication).
107. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (finding that victim impact evidence
may be admitted at sentencing phase of capital trial); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15
(1982) (finding that the trial judge erred in excluding mitigating evidence from sentencing phase
of capital trial).
108. For an insightful discussion of this topic, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure,
Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About
the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079 (1993). Legislators have not entirely
abandoned the field, of course, as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure show. Nevertheless,
many areas of police and prosecutorial practices are still regulated in broad terms by constitu-
tional common law.
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never see the people or hear the words of those on whom the burdens
of race-based decisionmaking fall most heavily. 109 And while this in-
sular feature has always accompanied judicial rulemaking, the inabil-
ity to see the mosaic of contacts between citizens and the criminal
system means that the contours of the rules are disproportionately
shaped by the backgrounds, assumptions, and world views of the
judges and justices. How serious judges perceive the problem of race-
based decisionmaking to be may depend as much on the attitudes that
they bring to the bench as on the limited, and necessarily sterile, infor-
mation they learn while judging.110
More importantly, courts must worry about intellectual consis-
tency in ways that legislatures do not. In McCleskey, for example, the
Court worried that if the Fourteenth Amendment is offended by sta-
tistics showing a correlation between race and the death penalty, it
might be equally offended by similar correlations between race and
imprisonment, or race and charging decisions."' In such a case, the
demands of consistency could have brought the criminal system to its
knees, and thus, the first link in the chain of logic was rejected. Legis-
lators need not worry about such niceties. It would be perfectly ac-
ceptable for Congress or a state to find the statistics in McCleskey
legally significant and worthy of remediation, while rejecting even
109. Cf. Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, 82, 84 (recounting inter-
view with Justice Kennedy, who worried about the appointment of young judges because appel-
late judging is such a "quiet existence": "You have the blue brief and the red brief for thirty
years, and that's about it. You don't see real people-you're not in a real courtroom, in the
sense of juries, and attorneys shouting at each other.").
110. The point is not that appellate judges are clueless about the "real world" of criminal
procedure (a charge that could perhaps be better leveled against academics). Judges had a life
before the bench, and a judge who practiced criminal law before her elevation to the bench is
probably better in touch with the realities of criminal procedure than many legislators. The
point is simply that courts are institutionally ill-equipped to address the broad-gauge problems
presented by the intersection of race and the criminal law. Courts are structurally designed to be
reactive to problems, and when they act proactively-making a new rule of law or procedure to
address a recurring concern-they necessarily act on the limited records that are generated in
the litigation process. This process may be the best way to dispense individual justice, but is
probably not the best way to make social policy.
111. There is no doubt that the fear of a "runaway" McCleskey rationale influenced the
Court's decision in that case. As the majority candidly observed:
McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system .... [I]f we accepted McCles-
key's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the
claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to
apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in
other minority groups, and even to gender. Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates
to the race of his victim, other claims could apply with equally logical force to statistical
disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the criminal justice
system, such as defense attorneys or judges.
481 U.S. at 314-17 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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more compelling statistics about race and other areas of the criminal
law. The gravitational pull of stare decisis does not limit a legislature's
freedom to enact partial solutions to global problems. 112
The second explanation for the Court's lack of sympathy toward
bias claims is tied to its view of juries. The Court correctly sees the
jury as a shield against oppression, 113 and has devoted a great deal of
attention to ensuring that juries are fairly selected in a race-neutral
manner. It has long prohibited the intentional exclusion of Blacks
from juries,"1 4 and when states adopted underhanded schemes to en-
sure all-White panels, the Court was willing to look behind the state's
rationalizations and insist on fairness in fact as well as in theory. 1 5
When the equal protection standard seemed too difficult to meet, the
Court created the fair cross-section doctrine, so that even inadvertent
underrepresentation could be remedied. 1 6 Batson made it signifi-
cantly harder for the prosecutor to deny minorities the right to serve
on juries,1 7 and subsequent cases have expanded the protection." 8
When there is a substantial likelihood that a trial might be infected by
112. This ability to pick and choose specific problems to address is shown in the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which included special provisions for women
but not men, children but not adults, and the elderly but not younger citizens. See Pub. L. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1910-16, 2038-43, 2081 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42
U.S.C. (1994)). Indeed, Congress attempted to attack legislatively the issue raised in McCleskey
in the Racial Justice Act, which eventually was deleted from the 1994 law. For a summary of the
Racial Justice Act, see KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 345-48. For a more detailed discussion, see
Vada Berger, et al., Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 461-96 (1989).
113. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 310 ("[I]t is the jury that is a criminal defendant's fundamen-
tal 'protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice."') (quoting Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)).
114. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-09.
115. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 560-61 (1953) (noting that jurors purportedly
selected by choosing names at random from box, but names of Black jurors placed on different
color tickets than names of White jurors); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 129 (1940) (noting prac-
tice of placing names of prospective Black jurors last on list, then selecting jurors in order that
names appeared on list); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591-96 (1935) (using a key man system
to select jurors resulted in no Blacks being selected for jury service; apparent altering of court
records to make it appear that Blacks were considered); see also KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 172-
73.
116. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). For a discussion of the development
of the fair cross-section doctrine, see Martha Craig Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury Selec-
tion Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1, 19-50 (1975).
117. See supra note 100.
118. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1992) (extending prohibition on
race-based peremptory challenges to defense counsel); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991)
(holding that defendant may raise Batson challenge even when he does not share the race of the
removed juror). Other decisions in the Batson line of cases have been less favorable to defend-
ants. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991) (finding no Batson violation for
peremptory strikes of Latino jurors where reason for strikes unrelated to ethnicity, despite pros-
ecutor's knowledge that strikes would have disparate impact on group).
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racial prejudice, the Constitution requires that potential jurors be
questioned about their biases.119 In short, the Court has actively con-
stitutionalized the jury system, put enormous faith in the idea that if
racial bias is detected and eliminated at the pre-trial stage, this will
minimize the bias at the result stage.
The Court's reliance on juries to be the primary backstop against
race-based behavior leaves several problems unaddressed. The first is
that most cases never get to a jury-roughly 90% of the defendants
convicted in federal court plead guilty rather than proceed to trial.120
The second is that even if juries prevent unjust convictions, they can
do little to prevent illegitimate practices. Juries are never asked to
decide if a Terry stop was legitimate, whether a prosecutor is treating
Black and White defendants differently, or whether legislatively man-
dated sentences disproportionately punish African Americans. Juries
only decide the case before them, and are rarely given the information
they would need if their task was to evaluate the government's con-
duct.121 Even when a jury occasionally detects a bad odor emanating
from the prosecutor's case, its only option is to nullify the charges, an
awkward and unsatisfying solution. 22
The overarching problem with relying on juries to be the prime
cleansing agent of discrimination has been neatly identified by Profes-
sor Albert Alschuler: we put far too many resources into selecting a
jury, and too few resources into evaluating what juries do once se-
lected.123 Jurors intent on giving play to their biases will not be forth-
119. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.
28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that a defendant accused of interracial capital crime entitled to have
potential jurors questioned on racial bias); cf. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976) (limiting
Ham).
120. See Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 9, at 448 tbl.5.27. In 1996, 60,255
criminal defendants were processed by the federal district courts, 52,270 (roughly 87%) of whom
were convicted. See id. Of those who were convicted, 48,196 (92%) pled guilty or nolo con-
tendere. See id. Of the total number of criminal defendants processed by the district courts
(including those who were acquitted or had their case dismissed), only 4175 (roughly 7%) ever
appeared before a jury. See id.
121. Jurors would not, for example, be able to evaluate a claim that Black defendants were
being charged with more serious crimes or receiving harsher sentences than Whites, since evi-
dence of other charges or possible sentences normally would not be admissible at trial. Cf.
United States v. McKenzie, 922 F.2d 1323, 1327 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he sixth amendment re-
quires that a jury determine only questions of guilt or innocence; punishment is the province of
the court.").
122. For a discussion of the problems with jury nullification, including an argument that ju-
ries lack sufficient evidence to make a rational nullification decision, see Andrew D. Leipold,
Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 303-04 (1995).
123. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153 (1989):
[Current jury selection practices] have captured the worst of two worlds, creating bur-
densome, unnecessary and ineffective jury controls at the front end of the criminal trial
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coming about their prejudices, so even the combination of challenges
for cause and peremptories may not be enough to catch those for
whom skin color is an important piece of evidence. By making ver-
dicts virtually unreviewable 124 and disabling jurors from impeaching
the verdict, we probably put more faith in voir dire than may be ap-
propriate.125 In short, solving the problem of biased decisionmaking
requires more than juries can give.
B. The Problem Reconsidered
Given the Court's apparent lack of interest in these claims, the
obvious means for reducing the impact of race are the ones least likely
to occur. Suggesting that the Court overrule Whren, lower the discov-
ery bar in Armstrong, and otherwise reverse course is tilting at legal
windmills, at least for the foreseeable future. The current Court seems
convinced that the problem is too small and the remedial costs too
large to make dramatic changes, and so the search for solutions should
begin by taking the case law close to where we find it.
Some suggestions are offered below. All require further thought;
none is a complete cure. Each, however, can produce small gains in
the battle at relatively little cost.
1. Challenges to discretion, writ large
Judicial indifference to bias claims is partly the product of earlier
triumphs. Courts and lawmakers have done a remarkable job over
the last few decades at eliminating the overt manifestations of racism:
from official intolerance of improper remarks and behavior, to stan-
dardized sentencing, to greater minority representation on the bench,
at the bar, and in the jury box, the journey toward formal equality has
been imperfect but impressive. One consequence, however, has been
to drive most racial animosity underground, making it harder to detect
while failing to implement badly needed controls at the back end. Although we have
devoted substantial resources to implementing our front-end procedures, we generally
have refused to expend significant resources to determine whether they have worked.
Indeed, we often have turned aside clear evidence of their failure.
Id. at 154-55.
124. The reluctance to review jury decisions is reflected not only in the rules against im-
peaching a verdict, see supra note 93, but also in the double jeopardy rule against appealing an
acquittal, and in the judicial reluctance to use special verdicts in criminal cases. For an opinion-
ated view on granting verdicts such great deference, see Leipold, supra note 122, at 260-78.
125. For a valuable discussion of this issue, see Alschuler, supra note 123; see also Johnson,
supra note 42, at 1651 ("Unfortunately, all of the traditional protections against racially biased
verdicts-the assurance of a representative jury, the screening out of biased jurors, or the control
of the content of the jury's deliberations-are inappropriate tools for neutralizing the effects of
the amount and kind of bias documented in [Johnson's article].").
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or even measure. A police officer, prosecutor, or juror can no longer
admit their biases against minority defendants in public, but can still
act on them in carrying out their duties. 126
A critical preliminary step to attacking the problem would be to
reach common ground on its size and dimensions. Traffic stops, Terry
stops, charging decisions, and indictments are all official public acts,
and thus their frequency and characteristics can properly be compiled
and scrutinized. 2 7 Although relying on statistics is fraught with dan-
gers of imprecision and manipulation, 2 8 they can still provide valua-
ble insight on how the police and prosecutors as a group are exercising
their discretion.'2 9 A police department that, over time, stops Black
motorists twice as often as White drivers should arouse suspicion (at
least in the absence of an explanation), even though this statistic
would admittedly tell us nothing about what a particular officer was
thinking when he turned on the blue lights.
Gathering information on discretionary police and prosecutor de-
cisions would help both judges and legislators. Properly gathered and
126. Cf Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1169 ("Dominative racists, those who express
bigoted beliefs and hostility openly and frequently through physical force, are now rare; aversive
racists, prejudiced persons who do not want to associate with Blacks but rarely will say so, are
more common.").
127. The Department of Justice's Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics (among other organi-
zations) already compiles statistics on arrests, charges, and convictions, often broken down by
race. See Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 9, tbls. 4.11, 5.20, 5.51; see also Bureau
of Justice Statistics Homepage (visited Apr. 24, 1998) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/>. These sta-
tistics tend to be highly generalized, however, making it impossible to determine whether dispar-
ities (if any) that correlate to race are caused by some other factor.
Some, more focused, information is also gathered, but is sufficiently inaccessible as to be
meaningless for those trying to study system-wide behavior. Many police departments keep
track of the contacts their officers have with suspects, for example, and virtually all keep track of
traffic stops if an arrest or seizure results (although if there is no arrest or seizure, records often
are not kept; see Harris, supra note 22, at 561). A defendant seeking access to this information,
however, is likely to be frustrated. Under both federal and state laws, most records compiled for
law enforcement purposes are exempt from disclosure under freedom of information statutes.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1994) (exempting from disclosure records that would interfere with law
enforcement proceedings, invade a person's privacy, or disclose police investigative techniques);
5 ILL. COaMP. STAT. 140/7(c) (West 1996) (similar provisions under Illinois law). More to the
point, the material is rarely compiled in a format that would be useful for a defendant seeking to
establish patterns of decisionmaking, and may not be gathered in any central location, such as
the Attorney General's Office. Thus, to make the information useful, the legislature would have
to compel a data-collection scheme that would both provide the information and protect legiti-
mate law-enforcement interests. An example of this is shown infra in note 135 and accompany-
ing text.
128. Besides the general difficulties created by the use of statistics, courts have noted the
specific problems with trying to isolate the racial variable from raw data that simply show a
correlation. See, e.g., Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1545, 1547-48 (M.D. Fla. 1995); McCles-
key v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 352-79 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.,
McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), affd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
129. Jury decisionmaking presents unique problems, discussed infra in Part IV.B.2.
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analyzed, the information would provide a more reliable database on
which judges could draw when assessing claims of racial decisionmak-
ing. Anecdotes and dispersed, unanalyzed complaints about police
behavior are usually unpersuasive evidence on which to ground con-
stitutional rules, especially if the complaints come from those hoping
to avoid a criminal conviction. Perhaps Whren and Armstrong would
have come out the same way even if there were reams of information
about police and charging practices, but it is at least possible that the
contours of those decisions would have changed if the evidence were
as stark as the allegations. 130
Providing more detailed data could also help both defendants and
prosecutors. One serious barrier to proving race-based conduct by
police and prosecutors is the need to present evidence of similar be-
havior in other cases, information that defendants seldom have the
resources to gather. 131 Whatever its other failings, governments are
good at collecting data, and thus at least some of the statistics that a
defendant might need could be gathered at relatively little cost.1 32
Even police and prosecutors could benefit from the increased infor-
mation: to the extent the statistics reveal no disparate impact, or ex-
plain an apparent disparity, there is less risk that a sympathetic judge
will rely on anecdotes and impose an unwarranted remedy. 133
Legislators and academics have recognized the importance of
gathering reliable statistics in this sensitive area. In March 1998, the
House of Representatives passed the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act
130. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (denying request for discovery
of prosecutorial practices, noting, inter aria, that proffered evidence "failed to identify individu-
als who were not black, could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were
charged, but were not so prosecuted;" proffered evidence also "recounted hearsay and reported
personal conclusions based on anecdotal evidence").
131. Over ten years ago the Court recognized that requiring a criminal defendant to show
discriminatory conduct in cases other than his own can impose a "crippling" burden of proof,
one that will rarely be met. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223, 227 (1965), the Court ruled
that the race-based exercise of peremptory challenges could violate the Equal Protection Clause,
but required proof of a pattern of their discriminatory use. Twenty years later, the Court ac-
knowledged that the bar had been raised too high, and permitted proof of discriminatory per-
emptories based solely the prosecutor's conduct in the moving defendant's case. See Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986); cf. Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal To Elimi-
nate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099,1101-02
(1994) ("A list of jury-discrimination claims under Swain reveals that between 1966 and 1984,
over 75 defendants failed to meet the Swain test; during those same years only two succeeded
(against the same prosecutor)." (footnote omitted)).
132. See supra note 127.
133. Cf. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469-70 (using government statistics to criticize court of ap-
peals's assumption that people commit crimes in proportion to numbers in the population, stat-
ing: "Presumptions at war with presumably reliable statistics have no proper place in the analysis
of this issue.").
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of 1988,'13 a bill that had originally been introduced by Representa-
tive John Conyers shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in
Whren. Under the proposed Act, the Attorney General would be re-
quired to conduct a study of the relationship between police decisions
to stop motorists and the motorists' race, age, and ethnicity. The
study would include data on the number of people stopped for traffic
violations (including their race and age), the traffic infraction that was
allegedly committed, whether a ticket was issued, whether a search
was conducted as a result of the stop, and the degree to which any
search resulted in seizures of drugs and drug proceeds. The data ob-
tained by the Attorney General would be compiled and presented to
Congress, but the use to which the information would be put is lim-
ited. To make the bill politically palatable, there are no quotas, be-
havior targets, or penalties for police; the bill is also explicit in
providing that the collected data "shall not be used in any legal or
administrative proceeding to establish an inference of discrimination
on the basis of particular identifying characteristics."'1 35 There is no
134. H.R. 118, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998). As of the date of this article, the bill is before the
senate Judiciary Committee.
135. The relevant parts of the bill are as follows:
Sec. 2 ATTORNEY GENERAL TO COLLECT
The Attorney General shall conduct a study of stops for routine traffic violations by law
enforcement officers. Such study shall include collection and analysis of appropriate available
data. The study shall include consideration of the following factors, among others:
(1) The number of individuals stopped for routine traffic violations.
(2) Identifying characteristics of the individual stopped, including the race and or ethnicity
as well as the approximate age of that individual.
(3) The traffic infraction alleged to have been committed that led to the stop.
(4) Whether a search was instituted as a result of the stop.
(5) How the search was instituted.
(6) The rationale for the search.
(7) Whether any contraband was discovered in the course of the search.
(8) The nature of such contraband.
(9) Whether any warning or citation was issued as a result of the stop.
(10) Whether an arrest was made as a result of either the stop or the search.
(11) The benefit of traffic stops with regard to the interdiction of drugs and the proceeds of
drug trafficking, including the approximate quantity of drugs and value of drug proceeds seized
on an annyal basis as a result of routine traffic stops.
Sec. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF DATA.
Data acquired under this section shall be used only for research or statistical purposes and
may not contain any information that may reveal the identity of any individual who is stopped or
any law enforcement officer. Data acquired under this section shall not be used in any legal or
administrative proceeding to establish an inference of discrimination on the basis of particular
identifying characteristics.
Sec. 4. RESULTS OF STUDY.
Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General
shall report the results of the study conducted under this Act to Congress.
H.R. 118, 105th Cong. §§ 2-4 (1998).
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obvious reason why the information gathering required by this Act
could not be done in other areas of the criminal process as well.136
But as the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act recognizes, the cru-
cial question is how these data would be used. Here the focus should
shift away from an individual defendant challenging to an individual
decision and toward the behavior of institutions; rogue police and
prosecutors are troublesome, but rogue departments are worse. It
would conserve resources and lead to better judicial decisions if those
who felt aggrieved by racially based conduct brought a group-wide,
civil rights action for relief.137 By class action or otherwise, parties
could present evidence-including the government's data on the deci-
sionmaking pattern in question-that the police department or prose-
cutor's office was engaging in discriminatory conduct, and seek an
injunction against future violations. 138 If the court found a violation,
it could monitor the department's future behavior, and ensure compli-
ance with the court's contempt power.139 These actions could be
136. Some legislative efforts have been made to obtain more focused statistics. The 1994
Crime Control Bill, for example, requires the U.S. Attorney General to "acquire data about the
use of excessive force by law enforcement officers." 42 U.S.C. § 14142(a) (1994). As with the
information sought under the Conyers Bill, supra note 135, the data are to be used only for
research or statistical purposes, and the results are to be published annually. See id. § 14142(b)-
(c).
137. The most likely manner of raising these challenges would be pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which permits a civil cause of action against any person acting under the color of state
law who deprives another of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994);
see also supra note 64. This remedy would supplement the current ability of defendants to chal-
lenge decisions, either through motions to suppress or more direct challenges. See infra Part
IV.B.
138. Cf. Carter v. Jury Commission of Green County, 396 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1970) ("The
federal courts are not incompetent to fashion detailed and stringent injunctive relief that will
remedy any discriminatory application of [a facially neutral] statute at the hands of the officials
empowered to administer it."). Although prosecutors are normally immune from paying dam-
ages, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991), they could be required to bring their future
practices into conformity with the law.
139. This suggestion is by no means new. There have been several efforts to use civil class
actions to combat race-based police practices in different states, with mixed results. For exam-
ple, Professor David Harris has described the efforts made in Florida, Maryland, Illinois, and
Colorado. See Harris, supra note 22, at 561-73. The Maryland and Colorado cases resulted in
favorable settlements for the plaintiffs: in addition to paying damages, the Maryland police
agreed to stop using race-based drug courier profiles, and to maintain records for three years on
the race of the drivers stopped and the results of the stops. See id. at 565-66. But see id. at 566
(noting that records kept by police suggest continuation of prior practices). The Colorado litiga-
tion also resulted in a cash settlement, and the disbanding of a police Task Force that the federal
district court found had violated the Constitution by making race-based stops. See id. at 569.
The result in Florida shows some of the difficulties with using civil remedies. See id. at 563.
Plaintiffs in central Florida filed two lawsuits, each apparently seeking class action certification.
See id. The district court denied the request to certify the class, finding that the individual plain-
tiffs and the civil rights organization lacked standing. See id.; Washington v. Vogel, 156 F.R.D.
676, 681, 683, 684 (M.D. Fla. 1994). The plaintiffs then apparently proceeded individually, but
their claim was dismissed because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show that
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brought by criminal defendants, but would not have to be; innocent
citizens who were unfairly investigated or charged might be able to
bring the challenge directly,140 thereby avoiding the awkwardness of
granting relief to a defendant who is accused of a serious crime.
Targeting the whole governmental unit, rather than the individual
officer or prosecutor, should make the data on investigations and
charging decisions more relevant, thereby removing one of the
problems defendants now face-gaining access to similar decisions in
other cases. Now, however, there would be less need to show that a
single police officer or prosecutor discriminated against a specific sus-
pect. Since the challenge would be brought on behalf of a large
number of citizens, it should be enough to show that race played a
part in some of the official decisions. Although institutions cannot
"intend" to discriminate, the collective, intentional decisions of the
institution's actors can surely be the culmination of individual biases.
Police departments and prosecutor's offices have folkways and pat-
terns of behavior, and if those patterns show a persistent, unexplained
correlation to race, it is hard to understand why courts should not in-
tervene, even if the precise state of mind of a named government ac-
tor cannot be conclusively established. 141
Even showing a systemic bias through the use of statistics would
be difficult, of course, and thus some assistance from the courts would
be required. If the Court is serious about abolishing bias from the
system, the most straightforward and least intrusive way to do so
would be to borrow the procedures already used in another equal pro-
tection context: those employed in Batson v. Kentucky.142  Courts
the traffic stops were based on race. See Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1542, 1545 (M.D.
Fla. 1995), affd, 106 F.3d 415 (lth Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Harris, supra, at 563
& n.110.
140. In some areas there would appear to be plenty of innocent citizens who might be candi-
dates for plaintiffs in a class action. See Macln, supra note 42, at 251-55 & 255 n.50 (citing
examples of police stops of innocent Blacks in Massachusetts, Los Angeles, and Dayton). See
also Butler, supra note 42 (African-American law professor describing how Black police officers
followed and questioned him, wondering if he was homeless or drug addict because he was
walking through (his) residential neighborhood at night).
141. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) provides a useful (but not perfect) exam-
ple. There a defendant offered statistical evidence to support his claim that Blacks were being
systematically excluded from grand jury lists. The Court found that the numbers, coupled with
the procedures followed by jury commissioners, created a prima facie case of discrimination, and
thus the burden shifted to the state to explain the disparity. See id. at 631-32. Although the
clerk of the trial court swore that race had not been a factor in the selection process, the
Supreme Court was unconvinced. In telling language, the Court found it unnecessary to decide
that a specific commissioner had discriminated: "The result bespeaks discrimination," said the
Court, "whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury commis-
sioner." Id. at 632 (citation omitted).
142. For a discussion of Batson see supra note 100.
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could permit statistics to create a prima facie case of governmental
discrimination, which would shift the burden to the state to show that
there were race-neutral reasons for those decisions. 143 If the state of-
fered such an explanation, the party claiming discrimination would
then be able to put on evidence that the reasons were a pretext; the
moving party would always have the ultimate burden of proving inten-
tional discrimination.144 Statistics would thus occupy a middle
ground-not per se proof of intent, but a warning sign that shifts the
onus to the state to explain the disparities.
While such a scheme would demand some allocation of judicial
resources, the burden on the system.should be relatively slight. Un-
like Batson challenges, which can occur in any case, defendants or civil
plaintiffs would only rarely have the data to mount a challenge, but
when they did it would be a system-wide challenge that would allow
for a single (if temporary) resolution. 145 Although the government
would have to spend time and money defending its practices, in most
cases it would probably rest its defense on showing alternative expla-
nations for the proffered statistics, and allow the plaintiff's burden of
proof to work to the government's benefit. Nonetheless, judges would
remain free to detect fire if they smelled smoke: if the statistics were
especially stark, and the prosecutor's explanation unconvincing, the
courts would remain free to decide that racial considerations were the
dominant influence and take appropriate remedial steps. 146
143. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296 n.18 (1987) (noting Court's "longstanding
precedents ... that a prosecutor need not explain his decisions unless the criminal defendant
presents a prima facie case of unconstitutional conduct with respect to his case" (emphasis
added)).
144. Cf. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam) (describing three steps of a
Batson challenge: (1) The moving party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2)
the burden of production then shifts to the non-moving party (usually the government) to pro-
vide a race-neutral explanation for the decision; (3) the trial judge must then decide if the mov-
ing party has proved purposeful racial discrimination).
145. Cf supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing class-action challenges to alleg-
edly discriminatory police stops).
146. Batson itself has been sharply criticized, and so any proposal that follows a Batson
model would naturally raise similar concerns. The primary worry seems to be that courts too
readily accept the prosecutor's "race neutral" explanation for his decisions, making the prohibi-
tion against race-based peremptories illusory. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
376-78 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ogletree, supra note 131, at 1106-08; see also Alschuler,
supra note 123, at 175-76 (noting "difficult and burdensome task" of deciding race-neutral expla-
nations, "[e]ven when prosecutors are forthcoming").
The judicial inquiry in a class-wide challenge need not be so deferential. Explaining why
large numbers of prosecutors or police made similar decisions about Black suspects may not be
as easy for the government as explaining why a single prosecutor decided to remove a juror
peremptorily. Cf. Alschuler, supra, at 176 (noting the prosecutors have successfully explained
peremptory strikes by pointing to jurors' posture, demeanor, and head-nodding toward defense).
Moreover, it may be that judges are not as tolerant of explanations as is popularly believed.
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At least two objections to this scheme suggest themselves. One is
that this route is foreclosed by McCleskey v. Kemp, where the Court
held that jurisdiction-wide statistics concerning the impact of race on
the imposition of the death penalty were insufficient to establish the
required discriminatory intent.147 It would not strain the law or logic,
however, to limit McCleskey to its context-an unsuccessful effort to
use multiple verdicts to prove discriminatory intent by a specific jury.
Stated simply, juries are different enough from other government
decisionmakers that a conclusion about verdicts should tell us little
about other official decisions.
One of the infirmities of Warren McCleskey's claim was that he
tried to extract proof of a single motive based on the conduct of a
large number of decisionmakers. The various juries in the Baldus
study had no connection to each other, their verdicts did not represent
government policy except in the most formal sense, and who, because
they would not make any future decisions, could be stopped from en-
gaging in the conduct only by removing the death penalty as a sen-
tencing option. Using statistics to create an inference of
discriminatory intent by police departments and prosecutor's offices is
a much smaller leap. Both groups are repeat players in the justice
systems, all police and prosecutors are subject to the same training
and rules as others in their group, all answer to a hierarchy, and most
importantly, the future conduct and decisions of police officers and
prosecutors can be influenced by the courts. Even if the biased deci-
sionmaking is limited to a few bad cops or prosecutors, it still seems
entirely fair to assume an office-wide policy of intentional bias if the
statistics are sufficiently stark. And so while the Court might ulti-
mately rely on McCleskey in rejecting a statistics-based argument, the
differences between juries and other government actors are suffi-
ciently great that the opinion does not compel that result.148
Professor Kenneth Melilli looked at all reported Batson decisions over a seven-and-half-year
period, and discovered that the courts rejected the prosecutor's explanation in about 16% of
those cases. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson
and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 447, 456, 459 (1996).
147. See supra Part III.C.
148. The Court in McCleskey noted that juries making decisions in capital cases were a far
cry from the normal type of decision where statistics had been accepted to prove discriminatory
intent:
[T]he nature of the capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of the statistics to
that decision, are fundamentally different from the corresponding elements in the ve-
nire-selection or Title VII [employment discrimination] cases.... Each jury is unique in
its composition, and the Constitution requires that its decision rest on consideration of
innumerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of the individual defend-
ant and the facts of the particular capital offense.
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A second objection is that the proposal violates the working
premise of this section-that solutions should work with existing law,
not fight against it. Moving to a Batson-like model of shifting pre-
sumptions would admittedly be a change in the law, perhaps an un-
manageably large one. But on reflection, it seems that the proposal is
more a matter of implementation than of substantive change. The
causes of action, most procedural rules, and intellectual foundation for
such challenges are already in place. Indeed, the Court has already
recognized the most important point in any proposal to attack race-
based decisions: that claims of racial bias are different from other
challenges, and that it is permissible, even proper, to adopt different
rules to attack this unusually elusive problem.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that claims of race-based
decisionmaking can be treated differently in some settings, although
the depth of its commitment to the principle is unclear. In Vasquez v.
Hillery,149 the Court upheld the reversal of a twenty-four year old
murder conviction because Blacks had been intentionally excluded
from the indicting grand jury. Upsetting an otherwise valid conviction
because of a tainted indictment would have significant implications for
trial practice, and later that same term, the Court moved to limit the
breadth of Hillery. In United States v. Mechanik,150 the question was
whether an admittedly flawed grand jury process (but one with no
claim of racial bias) was grounds for overturning a subsequent convic-
tion. The Court ruled it was not, reasoning that a later, valid convic-
tion conclusively showed that the error at the grand jury stage was
harmless.' 51 Recognizing the tension this created with Hillery, the
Court distinguished its holding in a footnote: Hillery, it explained,
was
compelled by precedent directly applicable to the special problem
of racial discrimination .... [R]acial discrimination in the selection
481 U.S. at 294 (citation omitted). This distinction is telling. Prosecutors choosing juries, or
employers making hiring and firing decisions, seem much more like the investigative, detention,
and charging decisions that might properly be the subject of statistical presumptions of intent.
The differences between jury verdicts or indictments and other official decisions work both
ways, however. Just as McCleskey tells us relatively little about proving police and prosecutorial
motives, the unique features of juries would prevent a defendant from bringing the type of class-
wide challenges discussed above. For more on the ability to challenge jury decisions, see infra
Part IV.B.2.
149. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
150. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
151. The error in Mechanik was that two witnesses testified in tandem in the grand jury
room, even though Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d) permits only the "witness under
examination" to be present. The Court assumed for purposes of its opinion that the rule had
been violated. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 69.
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of grand jurors is so pernicious, and other remedies so impractical,
that the remedy of automatic reversal was necessary as a prophylac-
tic means of deterring grand jury discrimination in the future....
We think that these considerations have little force outside the con-
text of racial discrimination in the composition of the grand jury.
No long line of precedent requires the setting aside of a conviction
based on a rule violation in the antecedent grand jury proceedings,
and the societal interest in deterring this sort of error does not rise
to the level of the interest in deterring racial discrimination. 152
The Court has also recognized that race is different when it comes
to constitutionalizing voir dire. In the line of cases beginning with
Batson, the Court for the first time required trial judges to inquire into
the prosecutor's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges, but
only if there was evidence that the prosecution was using its strikes in
a racially discriminatory manner. 153 Part of the reasoning behind Bat-
son-jurors should not arbitrarily be denied the opportunity to serve
on juries154-would seem to apply across the board, suggesting that
peremptory challenges based on any constitutionally protected activ-
ity (e.g., political views, group memberships) should also be prohib-
ited. But to date, it is only when the prosecutor is exercising
peremptories based on race or gender 55 that courts will intervene. 56
Ultimately, even if the courts refuse to soften the procedures for
proving intent, data collection and class-wide civil claims could pro-
vide an important collateral benefit, one that may prove more impor-
tant than detecting deliberate bias. It seems probable that a large
percentage of the conduct that minority suspects find objectionable is
not the result of firmly held prejudices, but rather, of "unconscious"
racism. Police and prosecutors might believe in their hearts that they
152. Id. at 70 n.1 (citations omitted).
153. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
154. The prohibition on race-based peremptories is designed to protect not only the jurors,
but also defendants and societal interests in a fair trial. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,
48-49 (1992).
155. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
156. The Supreme Court has hinted, but has never held, that Batson is limited to peremptory
strikes based on race and gender. See, e.g., id. at 128 ("potential jurors, as well as litigants, have
an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored group
stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice." (emphasis added)); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) (noting that Batson was based on need to
eliminate legacy of race discrimination). Nonetheless, it has been argued that the Batson ration-
ale should also prevent the exclusion of jurors because of their beliefs, associations, and other
First Amendment activity. See Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting
Peremptory Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 567 (1996); see also Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection In Crim-
inal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming, Apr. 1998). Limiting Batson to race
and gender would be consistent with the notion that these specific problems are worthy of spe-
cial handling by the courts.
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have no racial animus, but if they see that those whom they arrest and
convict are disproportionately minority race citizens, they might find
it easier to believe that these groups are more likely to lie, more likely
to be dangerous, or are more crime prone than others, and make their
charging or detention decisions accordingly. 157  If confronted with
data about the overall behavior of their office, however, some prose-
cutors and police might recognize their unconscious assumptions, and
pause before acting. Under the Conyers bill,158 for example, the obvi-
ous hope is that when police see the statistics on traffic stops, they will
check themselves before pulling over the next young Black man for a
trivial violation. Whether this check comes from the officer's desire
not to discriminate against African Americans, from a desire not to be
a defendant in a civil action, or from a desire to please their superiors,
the result should be a more equitable distribution of stops.
We should not assume, however, that data compilation would be
an unqualified benefit. Even among well-meaning state actors, more
data may, for example, solidify the view that young men from certain
ethnic groups are more likely to commit certain crimes than those
from other groups, or perhaps are more prone to carry weapons. The
opposite may also be true, of course, but the point is that more data
could increase the current suspicions that police, prosecutors, and ju-
ries now hold-a more statistically valid correlation is easier to trans-
late into causation, increasing the likelihood that race will inform a
decision to stop, charge, or convict. There are enough instances of
statistics being used (and misused) in this manner to make increased
official studies a potential source of concern. 159
157. The literature on aversive racism is far more subtle than is suggested here. For an ex-
tended discussion of the issue, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal
Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1027-28 (1988) (citing social science literature on topic); Charles
R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Tanya Kateri Hernmndez, Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in
the Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence," 99 Yale L.J. 845, 852-55 (1990).
158. See supra note 135.
159. The use of sensitive racial information can already be seen in the Terry-stop cases, see
supra note 46, and drug-courier profile cases. See, e.g., United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 176
(6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting equal protection challenge where defendant alleged consensual airport
contacts based on race; to be improper, decision to approach suspect must be based "solely" on
race), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1060 (1996). In Maryland, for example, where African-American
drivers sued to enjoin race-based traffic stops (which routinely led to canine drug sniffs or re-
quests to search the car), the settlement included a promise by police not to use "race profiles"
in deciding whom to search. See Fletcher, supra note 24, at Al. Although the state denied the
profiles were ever used, the police apparently remained convinced of the correlation between
race and drugs. See id. The Maryland State Police described the high number of African Ameri-
cans stopped as an unfortunate byproduct of sound police work, and noted that "[t]he facts
speak for themselves." See id. For a criticism of the use of race in profiles, see Christopher
Slobogin, The World Without A Fourth Amendment, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 84-86 (1991).
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But we cannot be afraid of knowledge; whatever the truth about
race and crime, we are better off knowing it. If some of the correla-
tions between race and crime are the product of conscious bias, the
data can be a first step toward combating it. To the extent decisions
are the product of unrecognized bias, exposing official conduct to pub-
lic scrutiny might be the most effective method for ameliorating its
effects.
2. David's remedies
Gathering data and shifting burdens could make it easier to prove
bias claims in the future, but they are large steps that are unlikely to
occur without great debate and political ferment. In the meantime,
what are defendants like David to do?
For police investigations, the most troubling of the recent cases is
Whren. Defendants now have no ability under the Fourth Amend-
ment to show that race influenced the decision, 16° apparently leaving
the field open for those inclined to discriminate. The critical question
therefore becomes how serious courts will be about recognizing an
equal protection challenge. If the courts read Oliver as limiting Four-
teenth Amendment challenges, 161 or if they find that statistical evi-
dence is incompetent in light of McCleskey, 162 suspects like David
have little hope. But if the opening left in Whren is genuine, the evi-
dence of improper police motivations might still come to light.
Whren decided that the relevant question is not whether a rea-
sonable police officer would have stopped the car anyway (a position
urged by Mr. Whren163), but rather, whether an officer could have
validly stopped the suspect. 64 In an equal protection case, however,
defendant must prove that the officers acted with discriminatory in-
tent and that similarly situated people had not been stopped. 65 In
considering the latter point, the question of what a reasonable police
officer would have done comes back into play. A defendant can plau-
sibly argue that if most officers would not have pulled the car over for
the alleged offense (e.g., if police do not usually stop drivers who stay
too long at a stop sign), then the second prong of the test should be
160. See supra text accompanying note 48.
161. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
162. See Harris, supra note 22, at 553 ("It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, given McCles-
key and Armstrong, the Justices do not mean for many equal protection claims to succeed.").
163. Petitioner's Brief at 30-37, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
164. See 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
165. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (noting "ordinary equal pro-
tection standards" applied (citation omitted)).
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satisfied. The fact that the police could have pulled similarly situated
drivers over would be irrelevant, because this fact will always be true
in selective prosecution cases. Defendants may thus be able to pres-
ent through the back door what Whren says cannot come in through
the front.166
Making accommodations for race-based charging decisions is
tougher, because prosecutorial discretion is nearly sacrosanct. Other
than the civil remedies outlined above, the best that can realistically
be accomplished here is monitoring the decisions, in the hopes that
data about charging patterns will guide prosecutorial discretion in a
productive way. While discretion this broad is always fraught with
peril, in many ways it is less troublesome than the discretion given to
police and jurors. Prosecutors are a smaller group, make more visible
decisions than police do, and are more accountable than jurors. It
also seems probable that prosecutors would be more responsive to
any data that showed a disparate impact of their decisions than either
of the other groups.167
Jury decisions are the hardest to deal with, because the interests
in preserving the integrity of verdicts are so strong. We would not
tolerate for long a system where jurors could be pursued by the losing
party after trial, hoping to find a disgruntled member who would help
impeach the verdict. Even if post-verdict inquiries occasionally un-
covered clear evidence of racial influence, the information-gathering
costs would be so high, and the damage done to the jury system so
potentially great, the achievement would be pyrrhic.168 Here the best
method for recognizing the special problems of race may be to put all
trial participants on notice that any attempts to introduce race as a
166. Defendants would still have to jump the hurdle of proving discriminatory intent, a prop-
osition that Armstrong makes very difficult to establish. Here defendants would at least need
the type of data discussed supra in Part IV.A and perhaps the benefits of shifting presumptions
suggested supra in Part IV.B.1. The point here is not that equal protection claims will (or
should) be easy to prove, only that there may still be an avenue for presenting evidence of
discriminatory purpose.
167. See generally Days, supra note 57, at 184-89 (noting Justice Department efforts to fully
explore allegations of race-based treatment of African-American crack defendants, not only to
ensure compliance with legal requirements but also to ensure fair treatment).
168. Justice O'Connor vividly captured this point when she wrote: "There is little doubt that
postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation
of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however,
that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it." Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.
107, 120 (1987). Fears of chilling discussions in the jury room, undermining public confidence in
the verdicts, plus the desire to keep jurors from being hounded by losing parties have led courts
to limit a defendant's ability to offer evidence of the deliberations. See id. at 119-21; McDonald
v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915).
1998]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
factor is prohibited, and encourage judges to take swift action before
the verdict is returned if the threat of racism appears.
A Louisiana rule of criminal procedure illustrates the possibili-
ties. In state cases, a defendant is entitled to a mistrial on request:
when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by
the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in
argument, refers directly or indirectly to:
(1) Race, religion, color or national origin, if the remark or com-
ment is not material and relevant and might create prejudice against
the defendant in the mind of the jury.169
This is a significant step, but not a radical one. Because it is diffi-
cult to know what influences a jury, and impossible to correct many
errors once the verdict is returned, it is proper to warn counsel and
the court in advance that any attempt to influence the jurors with ra-
cial references will have serious consequences. And while many trials
will continue to have strong racial overtones even if nothing is said, in
the more typical case the absence of racial references should help
keep the jury focused. 170
If race was an obvious and inevitable part of the trial, a more
direct approach might be required: jurors could be instructed that
they have an affirmative obligation to report to the judge pre-verdict
if race appears to be playing an unhealthy role in the deliberations. A
judge has some ability to discipline a jury for misconduct until the
verdict is reached, and so a specific instruction to this effect might
encourage jurors to think about, and perhaps guard against, their
unarticulated biases. 171 For those inclined to make race an explicit
part of their decisionmaking, the threat of being reported to the judge
by another juror, coupled with the risk of an inquiry and mistrial,
might be enough of a muzzle to ensure that the bias remains
unspoken.
169. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 770 (West 1996). The comment to the Article notes
that mistrials are granted under the Rule for "remarks and comments which normally are not
cured and cannot be cured by an admonition." Id. cmt. a.
170. For an extended discussion of how "playing the race card" can influence a jury, see
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 256-310.
171. The reasoning behind this suggestion underlies a provision of the 1994 Crime Control
Bill related to the death penalty. Section 3593(f) provides that before a jury begins considering
the sentence, the judge must instruct that the defendant's or victim's race can play no part in the
deliberations, and that the jury must not return a death sentence unless it is convinced that it
would sentence any other defendant to death under the circumstances presented, regardless of
race. At the close of the deliberations, each juror must then sign a certificate affirming that race
played no role in his or her decision. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1966 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (1994)). While jurors can obviously lie about the
basis for their decision without fear of punishment, the hope is that forcing the jurors to affirm
the need for race-neutral decisionmaking will be beneficial.
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CONCLUSION
The problem of race and criminal justice will never be solved,
only managed. The only way to remove the influence of race is to
remove discretion, and so while there is no morally acceptable level of
racial bias, as a practical matter the issue must be recast: are there
ways to reduce the amount of race-based decisionmaking without un-
duly undermining the goals of detecting, prosecuting, and punishing
criminal behavior?
The suggestions offered above try to strike this balance. The pro-
posals might be fairly criticized for offering only limited promise in
the face of an urgent, even overwhelming, social problem. 172 The sug-
gestions are admittedly modest, but any plan that focuses only on the
criminal justice system will suffer this defect. Problems with the legal
system are in large part a consequence of racial problems found else-
where in our lives, and it would be naive to think that even sweeping
changes in criminal procedure would fix the social conditions and atti-
tudes that breed the problems in the first place. This realization does
not excuse foolish and short-sighted decisions that exacerbate racial
problems, nor does it forgive the lack of courage to experiment and
take risks with the criminal system. It is simply a recognition that in-
cremental change, even if frustratingly slow, is as likely to succeed in
the long run as sweeping revisions that are too far in front of our cur-
rent knowledge.
Some of the ideas would be politically unpopular; prosecutors
and police would object to a requirement that they compile even more
records, just as they would resent having the burden shifted to them to
explain how they didn't discriminate in carrying out their jobs. These
concerns are legitimate, but short-sighted. All of us-judges, lawyers,
defendants, citizens-have an enormous stake in the proper function-
ing of the justice system, making it critical that the operators of that
system be as free from invidious influences as possible. If the
problems caused by bias are large, we should detect and correct them;
if they are small, we should monitor official behavior to ensure they
stay that way. The current system, with its high suspicions but low
172. In some parts of the country the clash between the criminal law and the African-Ameri-
can community is extraordinary. In Washington, D.C., nearly 50% of the young Black men ages
18 to 35 are in prison, in jail, on probation, on parole, out on bond, or being sought on a warrant.
Five years ago the figure was 42%, revealing that the problem is getting worse despite a rela-
tively stable national crime rate. See Eric Lotke, Hobbling a Generation: Young African Ameri-
can Men in D.C.'s Criminal Justice System Five Years Later, (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://
www.igc.org./ncia/hobb.html>.
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tolerance of bias claims, should not be the end point of the efforts to
minimize race-based decisionmaking.
